






Smith, Ashley (2021) Should the law on corporate homicide be 






    
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 










Should the Law on Corporate Homicide be Reformed? 
Ashley Smith  
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of LLM(R)  
School of Law  
College of Social Science  
University of Glasgow  
August 2021 
Abstract  
This work addresses whether Scots law on corporate homicide, as currently set 
out in the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, should 
be reformed. Calls for reform have arisen against a backdrop of perceived 
inefficiency in the current law arising from the high profile public disasters and 
high number of industrial incidents in recent years. A consideration of this 
issue encompasses an examination of the legal framework on homicide in 
Scotland. A comparative approach is adopted to examining legal development 
prior to the CMCHA 2007. The effectiveness of the CMCHA 2007 is then 
examined with reference to English case law and issues highlighted as 
justification for reform are responded to. Taking into account these factors, the 
argument will be addressed as to whether the current law is effective or 
whether the reform is needed. It is concluded that there is no clear basis for 
reform at the present time.  
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Introduction 
Change to the law on corporate manslaughter was first considered in the UK by 
the Law Commission of England and Wales in 1994 following the first trial of 
this kind, Stanley and others.  “Obscurities” in the laws of manslaughter and 1
corporate criminal liability impeded the trial and the Law Commission stated 
that, “a real effort should be made to put the law on a clearer footing.”   2
In particular, it was felt that companies should be held accountable for their 
activities, especially in light of the unsuccessful prosecution of P & O Ferries,  3
in which, passengers perished after a vessel capsized. Since then, there were 
several other high profile public disasters such as the Southall and Hatfield Rail 
Crashes and the Larkhall gas explosion. All of these caused significant 
numbers of fatalities however most corporate manslaughter prosecutions failed 
and companies were often convicted of health and safety offences instead.  4
Only a few small companies were successfully prosecuted for corporate 
manslaughter and they often received low fines which led to a general view 
that companies were not being punished severely enough.  A minority of 5
commentators even said that, “corporations were getting away with murder”.  6
 Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter: A Consultation Paper (Law Com No 135) 4.1 1
citing Stanley and others (CCC No 900160, October 1990) 
 ibid 4.12
 ibid 4.25-4.31 citing R. v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd. (1990) 93 CrAppR 72 (Central 3
Criminal Court)
 Stuart Allan ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 or the Health and 4
Safety (Offences) Act 2008: Corporate Killing and the Law’ (PhD thesis, University of Glasgow 
2016) 136-137
 ibid 25
 ibid citing Rob Jones, 'Safety Crime: a case study of Transco' 1999) 19 <https://www.ljmu.ac.uk/6
LSA/LSA_Docs/RJ_Transco.pdf> accessed 24 September 2014; Maurice Punch, 'Suite violence: 
Why managers murder and corporations kill' (2000) 33 Crime, Law and Social Change 243
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It also led to the view that “safety crimes” were not being treated as seriously 
as other types of crime including corporate crimes.  7
Although the regulatory legislation, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, 
was, “considered successful in reducing deaths, injuries and ill health in the 
workplace”, it was felt that the issue of suitably attributing responsibility to 
individuals and companies needed to be addressed.  The Corporate 8
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (CMCHA 2007) came into 
force on 26th July of the same year in response to public feeling, however, it 
received a mixed response  and, at present, there are calls for further reform to, 9
“address an injustice that has not gone away.”   10
The purpose of this research is to answer the question of whether the CMCHA 
2007 should be reformed. To answer this question, I will attempt to address 
whether it adequately strikes a difficult balance between several factors. In 
particular, whether it avoids the over-punishment of individual managers, 
recognises the responsibility of a corporation as a corporation and ensures that 
victims’ deaths are properly acknowledged, especially to their families. This 
will include discussions about the test set out in the CMCHA 2007 s 1(1)(b), “a 
gross breach of a relevant duty of care”, and its blurring of the civil/criminal 
law boundary. These discussions aim to assess whether the 2007 Act suitably 
attributes liability for victims’ deaths or whether reform is needed.    
 ibid 3 citing Andrew Hopkins, 'Compliance with What?: The Fundamental Regulatory 7
Question’ (1994) 34 British Journal of Criminology 431 435; Gary Slapper, 'Corporate 
Manslaughter: an Examination of the Determinants of Prosecutorial Policy' (1993) 2 Social Legal 
Studies 423 424; Gary Slapper and Steve Tombs, Corporate Crime (Pearson Longman 1999) 196; 
Steve Tombs and Dave Whyte, Safety Crimes (Crime and Society, Willan Publishing 2007) 167
 ibid 58
 ibid 1 citing Frank B. Wright, 'Criminal liability of directors and senior managers for deaths at 9
work' (2007) Criminal Law Review 949, David Ormerod and Richard Taylor, 'The Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007' (2008) Criminal Law Review 589
 Scottish Parliament, ‘Culpable Homicide (Scotland) Bill Consultation Paper’ (Edinburgh: 10
Scottish Parliament 2018) <https://www.parliament.scot/S5MembersBills/
CULPABLE_HOMICIDE_draft_4-_with_UPDATED_extended_deadline.pdf> accessed 15 
December 2019 3
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Firstly, it is necessary to examine the background to the 2007 Act and how it 
operates in practice. To this end, Chapter 1 examines the position in Scotland, 
in particular, it provides an overview of the different laws on homicide to show 
how corporate homicide fits in and that the other homicide laws do not 
adequately address the issue of  deaths caused in the workplace. It also explains 
the issues with the common law prior to the CMCHA 2007 as seen in Transco 
Plc.   11
Chapter 2 provides a comparative approach by examining the common law in 
England prior to the CMCHA 2007 and it illustrates this with the case of  R v. 
Mark.  This illuminates the differences in approach across jurisdictions in 12
terms of legal development and the English law points to how the Scots law 
could be changed to make it more effective in practice.  
Chapter 3 explores the reasons behind the verdicts in the twenty-two English 
cases on corporate manslaughter as well as the penalties in order to assess the 
CMCHA 2007’s efficiency. Academic concern about the CMCHA 2007’s 
‘senior management’ test is also discussed with a view to establishing whether 
the concerns translate into reality. It concludes that the CMCHA 2007 is 
effective as evidenced by the results of the cases and that academic concern 
over the ‘senior management’ test is unjustified which indicates a lack of need 
for reform.   
Chapter 4 provides a theoretical discussion on how criminal responsibility 
should be attributed to companies in order to attempt to establish whether the 
CMCHA 2007 has attributed responsibility correctly. It establishes that 
negligence is the most suitable mens rea for corporate homicide/manslaughter 
and a fine on the company is the most suitable sanction. The CMCHA 2007 
provides both of those, again, indicating a lack of need for reform. 
 Transco Plc v. HM Advocate 2004 J.C. 2911
 R v. Alan James Mark Nationwide Heating Services Ltd [2004] EWCA Crim 249012
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Chapter 5 concludes that there is presently no clear case for reform of the 
CMCHA 2007.    
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Chapter 1: Homicide in Scotland  
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the current legal framework and treatment of homicide 
offences in Scots law. The term ‘homicide’ is used to denote both murder and 
culpable homicide. This chapter will cover the common law offences of murder 
and culpable homicide, the former providing context for the latter which is the 
greater focus. The statutory offences of causing death in the context of road 
traffic offences and in the workplace will then be examined. The former 
demonstrates a history of the legislature treating certain instances of culpable 
homicide separately and in a specialist manner and the latter can be seen as a 
further example of that. Through this overview of homicide laws, it can be seen 
how corporate homicide fits in with the other laws and that the others do not 
adequately address the issue of deaths caused in the workplace. There is then 
an examination of the problems inherent in the Scots law, prior to the CMCHA 
2007, as set out in Transco Plc where the Crown attempted to prosecute a 
company for culpable homicide.  This examination covers issues connected 13
with the concepts of negligence, the directing mind and will of a company and 
aggregation. 
1.1 Murder  
Macdonald provided the traditional definition of murder as follows, “Murder is 
constituted by any wilful act causing the destruction of life, whether intended 
to kill, or displaying such wicked recklessness as to imply a disposition 
depraved enough to be regardless of consequences.”  Macdonald’s definition 14
 Transco Plc (n 11)13
 John Hay Athole Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland (James 14
Walker and D.J Stevenson eds, 5th edn, Edinburgh: W Green, 1948) 89
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of the dual mens rea, intention to kill and wicked recklessness, has since been 
clarified by the cases of Drury,  Purcell  and Petto.  15 16 17
In Drury, the appellant carried out a fatal attack on his ex-partner upon being 
provoked by discovering her relationship with another man.  On appeal, the 18
court considered the appropriate test to be applied in cases of killings provoked 
by infidelity.  Lord Justice-General Rodger went on to discuss how 19
provocation and self-defence fitted within the structure of murder. For 
example, he said that Macdonald’s definition of murder was, “at best 
incomplete and, to that extent, inaccurate.”  In particular, he commented that 20
Macdonald’s definition did not explain why, in cases where diminished 
responsibility, provocation or self-defence existed, the appropriate verdict was 
one of culpable homicide despite the accused having an intention to kill.  21
According to Lord Justice-General Rodger, it was because the accused did not 
carry out the offence with what Hume called a murderer’s “wicked and 
mischievous purpose”. He altered the first strand of the mens rea, intention, by 
holding that murder required a ‘wicked’ intention to kill.   22
The main question on appeal was whether the trial judge had misdirected the 
jury on the approach to take in deciding whether to return a verdict of culpable 
homicide on the ground of provocation.  The trial judge had stated that the 23
jury must consider if the accused’s response had been “grossly 
disproportionate” to the provocation. If it was, the plea of provocation could 
 Drury v. HMA [2001] S.L.T. 101315
 HM Advocate v. Purcell (2008) J.C. 13116
 Petto v. HM Advocate 2012 J.C. 10517
 Drury (n 15) [4] (Lord Justice-General Rodger)18
 ibid [1] (Lord Justice-General Rodger) 19
 ibid [10] (Lord Justice-General Rodger)20
 ibid [10] and [13] (Lord Justice-General Rodger)21
 ibid [11] (Lord Justice-General Rodger)22
 ibid [1] (Lord Justice-General Rodger) 23
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not succeed.  In the appeal, it was held that asking the jury to assess 24
proportionality in the context of violence in response to a revelation of sexual 
infidelity had, indeed, been a misdirection as the two acts are 
incommensurable.  Instead, it was held that the jury should have been asked to 25
consider whether the accused lost self-control and whether an ordinary person, 
subjected to the same provocation, would have been liable to act as he did. If 
an ordinary man would have reacted as the accused did or provocation leaves 
the jury with a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused acted wickedly, the 
correct verdict is culpable homicide.  The appeal was allowed  and it was 26 27
held that, in the circumstances, the appellant’s intention was not wicked, 
therefore, he lacked the mens rea for murder.   28
Chalmers agrees that the trial judge misdirected the jury by asking them to 
consider the proportionality of violence in relation to the revelation of 
infidelity. However, he disagrees with the route the appeal court took in 
reaching that conclusion. In particular, he rejects the view that Macdonald’s 
definition of murder was incomplete as it encompassed all the elements that the 
Crown had to prove in order to secure a conviction, namely, the actus reus, 
mens rea and lack of a valid defence. ‘Wicked intention’ - ‘wicked’ referring to 
the absence of any justification or excuse - incorporates a defence into the 
offence and this is not in keeping with the rules on evidence.  His view is that 29
this may lead to situations where a jury can reject provocation as a defence but, 
nonetheless, acquit the accused if they conclude he did not act wickedly.  He 30
further disagrees with the Lord Justice-General’s interpretation of Hume’s 
notion that a provoked killer is not to be regarded as a murderer as he lacks 
wickedness. According to Chalmers, it is not because the killer lacks mens rea 
 ibid [6] (Lord Justice-General Rodger)24
 ibid [27]-[28] (Lord Justice-General Rodger)25
 ibid [34] (Lord Justice-General Rodger) 26
 ibid [36] (Lord Justice-General Rodger)27
 ibid [17] (Lord Justice-General Rodger)28
 James Chalmers, ‘Collapsing the Structure of Criminal Law’ [2001] S.L.T. 28, 241, 241-24229
 ibid 24430
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but because provocation acts as a free-standing partial defence  and it would 31
have been preferable if it had been allowed to continue to change a murder 
charge into a culpable homicide conviction.  He states this decision, “threatens 32
to turn the Scottish law of criminal defences upside down”  and it has 33
ramifications for the laws on self-defence, diminished responsibility and 
offences such as assault.  34
The cases of Purcell  and Petto  altered the second strand of the mens rea, 35 36
wicked recklessness. In the case of Purcell, the accused drove recklessly in an 
effort to evade police. Unfortunately, in the process, he run over and killed a 
child.  At the conclusion of the case, the presiding judge referred the matter to 37
a bench of three judges as the accused’s counsel submitted that, given the facts 
alleged in the murder charge, it was not open for the jury to return a verdict of 
murder. The accepted position was that reckless driving, however appalling, 
which resulted in death could be considered culpable homicide but not 
murder.   38
The indictment in this case included a charge of murder and a number of 
instances of reckless and dangerous driving, which, had taken place before and 
after the collision. The Crown did not contend that the accused had had no 
intention of causing injury to the deceased.  However, the Crown had 39
attempted to argue that the doctrine of constructive malice could supply the 





 Purcell (n 16)35
 Petto (n 17) 36
 Purcell (n16) [1]-[2] (Lord Eassie)37
 Purcell (n 16) (JC Farquharson)38
 ibid [1] (Lord Eassie) 39
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In other words, under that thinking, if an accused were engaged in a 
serious, intentional — and usually capital — crime, guilt of murder 
would follow if death ensued in the course of the commission of that 
serious criminal enterprise, irrespective of the specific intention of the 
accused, his state of knowledge, or the degree of violence employed in 
the immediate events leading to the fatality.   40
It was held that constructive malice had no place in the modern role of murder 
and, in any event, there was no serious ‘capital’ offence in this case in relation 
to which the death was ancillary, the primary offence was only dangerous 
driving.  The submission for the Crown was unsound and the submission 41
advanced by counsel for the accused should be upheld.  At least in cases of 42
reckless driving, wicked recklessness required an intention to cause bodily 
harm. As this could not be shown, the correct conviction was culpable 
homicide instead of murder.  43
The case of Petto involved an appellant who pled guilty to murder after setting 
fire to a block of flats resulting in the death of one of the residents.  He 44
initially appealed before a bench of three judges and sought to withdraw his 
plea, submitting that the charge against him described culpable homicide rather 
than murder. The appellant’s senior council argued that the charge he had pled 
to did not amount to murder as it lacked the actus reus and mens rea. It did to 
contain any allegation that he had committed an assault or that he knew anyone 
was inside the block of flats at the time of the offence.  45
Amongst other questions raised in this appeal, one was whether Macdonald 
was correct in stating that murder is an appropriate charge where death has 
 ibid [14] (Lord Eassie)40
 ibid [17] (Lord Eassie)41
 ibid [18] (Lord Eassie)42
 ibid [16] (Lord Eassie) 43
 Petto v. HM Advocate 2009 S.L.T. 50944
 ibid [3] (Lord Wheatley)45
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resulted from a serious and dangerous crime albeit there was no specific intent 
to kill.  As Purcell had rejected this idea and because other residents who had 46
been in the flats were liable to be harmed, the court was of the view that the 
indictment may support a charge of murder.   47
However, as this may have been seen as an extension of the existing categories 
of murder and there was a lack of authority on the matter, the judges were of 
the view that the appeal should be heard by a larger bench. It remitted to a 
procedural hearing  and was then heard by a bench of five judges. There, 48
Purcell was distinguished because, in that case, there had been no intention to 
injure anyone.  The appellant in Petto had started the fire deliberately and in 49
the certain knowledge that residents would be at grave risk of death or serious 
bodily harm.  This case elevated the threshold for wicked recklessness to be 50
established, at least in cases where death results from fire-raising, by holding 
that there must be, a virtual certainty of death resulting from the perpetrator’s 
actions.  As this could be shown, the appellant’s guilty plea to murder could 51
not be withdrawn.  52
Although these cases have been controversial,  they have been considered by 53
the High Court when deciding other cases and they are now the current 
 ibid [8] (Lord Wheatley) citing John Hay Athole Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the 46
Criminal Law of Scotland (James Walker and D.J Stevenson eds, 5th edn, Edinburgh: W Green, 
1948) 91
 ibid [16] (Lord Wheatley) citing Purcell (n 16)47
 ibid [16] (Lord Wheatley)48
 Petto (n 17) [11]-[12] (Lord Justice-Clerk Gill) citing Purcell (n 16)49
 ibid [13] (Lord Justice Clerk Gill)50
 ibid [13] (Lord Justice-Clerk Gill)51
 ibid [32]52
 See e.g. Claire McDiarmid, ‘Something Wicked This Way Comes: The mens rea of Murder in 53
Scots Law’ [2012] Jur. Rev. 4, 283
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authority.  In addition to affecting the law on murder, the case of Drury  also 54 55
provided a definition of culpable homicide.  
1.2. Culpable Homicide 
In Drury, culpable homicide was defined as a residual offence, which, captures 
killings, “short of murder” but where a relevant measure of blame attaches to 
the perpetrator.  Like murder, the actus reus is essentially the destruction of 56
life, however, unlike murder, there is, “no time-honoured definition to which 
all cases initially make reference”.  The offence is divided into three 57
definitions or ‘types’ of culpable homicide and the type that applies depends on 
the circumstances. According to McDiarmid, this categorisation of the offence 
into these ‘types’ renders the definition more akin to a description.  58
Firstly, the ‘voluntary act type’ occurs when the mens rea of murder, namely 
wicked intention to kill or wicked recklessness, exists but provocation or 
diminished responsibility operates to reduce the crime to culpable homicide.  59
As discussed, in light of Drury,  it does not appear that this test would now 60
apply to cases involving provocation upon a finding of infidelity. Secondly, the 
‘involuntary lawful act type’ occurs where the accused, whilst acting lawfully, 
brings about the victim’s death. The mens rea is recklessness.  Thirdly, the 61
 See e.g. Gillon v. HM Advocate (2007) J.C. 24 [24] (Lord Osborne); Hainey v. HM Advocate 54
(2014) J.C. 33 [55] (Lord Clarke)
 Drury (n 15)55
 Drury (n 15) [13] (Lord Justice-General Rodger)56
 Claire McDiarmid, ‘Killings Short of Murder: Examining Culpable Homicide in Scots Law’ in 57
Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds), Homicide in Criminal Law: A Research Companion 
(Abingdon: Oxfordshire: Routledge 2018) 22 
 ibid58
 ibid 59
 Drury (n 15)60
 McDiarmid (n 57) 24 61
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‘involuntary unlawful act type’ occurs when the victim dies as a result of a 
criminal act such as assault. The mens rea is that of the underlying offence.   62
The law on culpable homicide has been critiqued as unclear, too broad and 
phrased in outdated language.  However, the ‘type’ categories have been 63
praised for being “slightly clearer” than the umbrella definition of “killings 
short of murder” from cases such as Drury.  A further issue is that the line 64
between murder and culpable homicide is blurred.  It may be thought that this 65
could only be exacerbated by the changes made to murder, and axiomatically, 
culpable homicide due to its residual nature, by the cases of Drury,  Purcell  66 67
and Petto.  68
In Elsherkisi v. HM Advocate, Lord Hardie said that motive should be 
considered as a separate concept from mens rea. The former is rightly used as 
an excuse or mitigation whilst the latter is used to establish the accused’s 
guilt.  The second strand of the mens rea as set out in Purcell and Petto, 69
respectively, an intention to cause bodily harm  and a virtual certainty of death 70
resulting from the perpetrator’s actions  could be considered to blur mens rea 71
and motive.    
 ibid 3062
 Gillian Mawdsley, ‘Consultation Response: Culpable Homicide (Scotland) Bill Consultation 63
Paper’ (The Law Society of Scotland, 24 April 2019) <https://www.lawscot.org.uk/media/
362512/24-04-2019-crim-culpable-homicide-scotland-bill-consultation-response.pdf> accessed 2 
February 2019 5 
 McDiarmid (n 57) 2364
 Mawdsley (n 63) 565
 Drury (n 15)66
 Purcell (n 16)67
 Petto (n 17)68
 Elsherkisi v. HM Advocate (2012) S.C.L. 181 [10] (Lord Hardie)69
 Purcell (n 16) [16] (Lord Eassie)70
 Petto (n 17) [13] (Lord Justice-Clerk Gill)71
!18
1.3 Statutory Offences  
1.3.1 Causing death by driving   
In addition to the common law, there are a number of separate statutory 
offences relating to causing death. Section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1960 
creates the statutory offence of ‘causing death by reckless or dangerous 
driving’. The modern law of ‘causing death by dangerous driving’  and 72
‘causing death by careless and inconsiderate driving’  is now enshrined in the 73
Road Traffic Act 1988. This Act developed to include a number of offences 
such as causing death whilst; driving under the influence of drink or drugs  74
and driving while unlicensed, uninsured  or disqualified.  It demonstrates a 75 76
history of the legislature treating certain instances of culpable homicide in a 
separate and specialist manner and evolving the law of homicide to reflect 
social change.  
As regards causing death by dangerous driving, the legislation provides, “A 
person who causes the death of another person by driving a mechanically 
propelled vehicle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an 
offence”.  A person is considered to have driven dangerously if, “the way he 77
drives falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful 
driver and it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving in 
that way would be dangerous.”  78
 Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA 1988) ss. 1 and 2A.72
 RTA 1988, ss. 2B and 3ZA.73
 RTA 1988, s 3A  as introduced by the Road Traffic Act 1991.74
 RTA 1988, s 3ZB as introduced by the Road Safety Act 2006.75
 RTA 1988, s 3ZC as introduced by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. 76
 RTA 1988,  s 1.77
 RTA 1988, s 2A(1)(a)-(b).78
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“Dangerous” refers to the danger of injury.  As regards the mens rea, it has 79
been likened to the type of recklessness required for murder, namely, an utter 
disregard for the fatal consequences.  The statute provides, “in determining…80
what would be expected of, or obvious to, a competent and careful driver in a 
particular case, regard shall be had not only to the circumstances of which he 
could be expected to be aware but also to any circumstances shown to have 
been within the knowledge of the accused.”  A person can also drive 81
dangerously if, “it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that 
driving the vehicle in its current state would be dangerous.”  In assessing the 82
state of the vehicle, regard can be had to, “anything attached to or carried on or 
in it and to the manner in which it is attached or carried.”  83
‘Causing death by careless driving when under influence of drink or drugs’ 
occurs where a driver causes a death whilst driving without due care and 
attention whilst at least one of these other factors apply; he was unfit to drive 
because of drink or drinks,  his alcohol or drug level was over the prescribed 84
limit,  he unreasonably refused to provide a specimen within 18 hours of the 85
incident  or he unreasonably failed to provide a blood sample when required 86
by Police to do so.  The accused is considered unfit to drive, “at any time 87
when his ability to drive properly is impaired”.  88
 RTA 1988, s 2A(3). 79
 Rachel McPherson and Cyrus Tata, ‘Causing Death by Driving Offences: Literature 80
Review’ (Scottish Sentencing Council, September 2018) 3 citing Transco PLC v. HM Advocate 
(2004) J.C. 29
 RTA 1988, s2A(3). (my own emphasis added)81
 RTA 1988, s 2A(1)(2). (my own emphasis added)82
 RTA 1988, s 2A(4). 83
 RTA 1988, s 3A(1)(a).84
 RTA 1988, s 3A(1)(b)-(b)(a).85
 RTA 1988, s 3A(1)(c).86
 RTA 1988, s 3A(1)(d).87
 RTA 1988,  s 3A(2).88
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The lesser offence of ‘causing death by careless driving’ occurs where, “A 
person…(is) driving a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or other public 
place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for 
other persons using the road or place.”  It shares a mens rea with ‘causing 89
death by careless driving through drink or drugs’. 
The person is, “regarded as driving without due care and attention if (and only 
if) the way he drives falls below what would be expected of a competent and 
careful driver.”  “In determining…what would be expected of a careful and 90
competent driver in a particular case, regard shall be had not only to the 
circumstances of which he could be expected to be aware but also to any 
circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.”  A 91
person is to be regarded as driving without reasonable consideration for other 
persons only if those persons are inconvenienced by his driving.   92
By contrast with causing death by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate driving, 
it is obvious from the provisions of the relevant sections of the 1988 Act that 
the offences of driving while unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured are strict 
liability.  No evidence of the accused’s mens rea or state of knowledge is 93
necessary in order for the Crown to secure a conviction. 
To have carelessness as a mens rea creates anomalies in the law in as much as 
it is considered a lesser form of recklessness or “gross negligence”.   It is, 94
therefore, at odds with the common law position that negligence should not 
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attract criminal sanctions.  In addition, the equating of carelessness with 95
recklessness is in contrast with older case law specifying this should not be the 
case.  96
The need for separate statutory offences to exist alongside the common law has 
been questioned for several reasons. Firstly, Purcell  showed that a conviction 97
for causing death due to poor driving was possible at common law. Secondly, 
in terms of fair labelling, the primary consideration is that the victim’s death 
has occurred unlawfully. The fact it occurred in the context of the accused 
driving is incidental. Thirdly, the creation of road traffic statutes criminalising 
deaths occurring in that context was due to the perceived unwillingness of 
juries to convict of common law murder or culpable homicide. Maher believes, 
that, even if this was so, it is an “unprincipled basis” upon which to justify such 
legislation.  A further and more recent example of a statute criminalising 98
deaths caused in a particular context is the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007. It could be considered that this is another 
example of the how the legislature has evolved homicide laws to provide a 
separate specialism in response to social change. It is also clear from the 
examination of the other homicide laws that they do not adequately address the 
issue of deaths caused in the workplace.  
1.3.2. Corporate Homicide  
The CMCHA 2007 states that an organisation is, “guilty of an offence if the 
way in which its activities are managed or organised causes a person’s death 
and amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the 
organisation to the deceased.”  From this, we see the actus reus is causing 99
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death where there is a gross breach of the relevant duty of care and the mens 
rea is negligence. However, the offence is only committed if, “the way in 
which its activities are managed or organised by its senior management is a 
substantial element in the breach.”   100
For the purposes of the 2007 Act, a “gross breach” occurs, “if the conduct 
alleged to amount to a breach of that duty falls far below what can reasonably 
be expected of the organisation in the circumstances”.  In assessing this, the 101
jury must consider whether the evidence shows that the organisation failed to 
comply with any health and safety legislation that relates to the alleged breach, 
and, if so, how serious that failure was and how much of a risk of death it 
posed.  In addition, consideration may be given to the extent to which the 102
evidence shows that there were attitudes, policies, systems or accepted 
practices within the organisation that were likely to have encouraged any such 
failure, or to have produced tolerance of it and regard may be given to any 
health and safety guidance that relates to the alleged breach.  Any other 103
matters the jury believe are relevant may also be taken into account.  104
The ‘relevant duty of care’ is defined as the duties under the law of negligence 
and include duties owed; to employees or other workers, as an occupier of 
premises, in connection with construction or maintenance operations and in 
connection with any other commercial activity.  “Senior management” are 105
defined as, “the persons who play significant roles in, “the making of decisions 
about how the whole or a substantial part of its activities are to be managed or 
organised” or “the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial 
part of those activities.”  106
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 CMCHA 2007, s 1(4)(b).101
 CMCHA 2007, s 8(2).102
 CMCHA 2007, s 8(3).103
 CMCHA 2007, s 8(4).104
 CMCHA 2007, s 2(1).105
 CMCHA 2007, s 1(4)(c)(i)-(ii).106
!23
The 2007 Act's reference to senior management as “persons” allows for 
aggregation. Aggregation means that, “even although a particular office holder 
is not guilty of that offence, an organisation would be guilty of the offence if 
the acts done by a number of different office holders at different times, when 
considered together, are sufficient to constitute the offence.”  The concept of 107
aggregation may cause difficulties for the Crown when it comes to proving the 
offence if managers differed either in their acts or their awareness of the 
circumstances. However, if liability is established then, unlike the other 
homicide offences, the company as an entity rather than the individual/s who 
made the decisions leading to the death is liable. This presents potential 
unfairness to organisations in as much as companies which may have taken 
considerable measures to prevent workplace deaths are still automatically held 
liable for managers’ acts.  To assist in understanding why the 2007 Act was 108
introduced the previous law on corporate homicide, as set out in Transco Plc v. 
HM Advocate,  will now be considered. In particular, concepts of negligence, 109
the directing mind and will of a company and aggregation will be examined.   
1.4 Transco Plc v HM Advocate  
Prior to the 2007 Act, the legal position on corporate homicide was set out in 
the Transco case.  In Transco, the appellant company had been served an 110
indictment containing the alternative charges of culpable homicide and 
contravention of the Heath and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 ss. 3 and 33(1). 
Transco was the gas provider to an area where a gas explosion had destroyed a 
house and killed the occupants. In the indictment, the charge of culpable 
homicide contained averments of the company’s knowledge and awareness of 
the various risks in the 13 years prior to the explosion. It also stated that the 
company failed, “with a complete and utter disregard for the safety of the 
public and in particular for the safety of [the four deceased]” to devise and 
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implement an appropriate management safety policy to avoid the attendant 
risks. A number of committees and posts were identified as being behind the 
company’s failures, but no individual was identified in the charge.   111
At a preliminary hearing, Lord Carloway refused to dismiss the culpable 
homicide charge on the ground of competency or relevancy. Transco appealed 
this decision.  It was held that the charge was competent as manslaughter was 112
a competent charge against a company in England and Wales  and the 113
applicable principles across both jurisdictions were the same.  However, the 114
charge was dismissed as irrelevant.  In arriving at this decision, three issues 115
arose which will be examined in turn: negligence, the ‘directing will and mind’ 
of the company and aggregation. The judiciary in Scotland and England have 
responded to these concepts differently. The result of this disparity in treatment 
is that different outcomes have been arrived at in corporate homicide and the 
English concept of corporate manslaughter. 
1.4.1 Negligence  
The court clarified that the common law crime of involuntary culpable 
homicide required an actus reus and mens rea.  In defining culpable 116
homicide, Lord Osborne considered the starting point to be the definition from 
Drury, namely, killings short of murder.  He then went on to consider a 117
definition from Macdonald: 
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…culpable homicide may result from neglect of proper precautions, or of 
moderation in the doing of what is legal, or from general carelessness and 
neglect of duty…(Cases) include every fatal accident which is not 
fortuitous, but results from some blameable conduct. The trend of legal 
development has been to draw a distinction between negligence which 
results in civil liability and negligence which results in criminal 
responsibility; and in the latter case to desiderate gross and wicked 
negligence or recklessness….(One is) guilty of homicide, only if his 
conduct is notably and seriously negligent or displays utter disregard for 
the safety of others.  118
Despite quoting this passage from Macdonald, it is clear Lord Osborne did not 
want to utilise the concept of negligence in his decision. He went on to 
consider Paton v. HM Advocate where it had been said:  
Unfortunately, this law has to some extent been modified by decisions of 
the Court, and it is now necessary to show gross, or wicked, or criminal 
negligence, something amounting, or at any rate analogous, to a criminal 
indifference to consequences, before a jury can find culpable homicide 
proved.  119
Lord Osborne critiqued this definition, saying that using the term ‘criminal’ 
before ‘negligence’ and ‘indifference to the consequences’ to describe a crime 
was circular and, “unprofitable”. He also said that the term ‘negligence’ was 
confusing as it was rightly used in the context of the English tort of negligence 
or as a general English parlance conveying, “carelessness or neglect of duty in 
a non-legal context.”  Instead, he preferred the terms, ‘gross or wicked … 120
indifference to consequences’ and made reference to several cases which, he 
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said, conveyed that what should be assessed was the perpetrator’s mind at the 
time of the offence.  Repeated reference to Quinn v. Cunningham  was 121 122
made and he said that the test for mens rea from Quinn as it was stated in 
Cameron v. Maguire avoided the issues that arose in Paton.  123
In Cameron, the test was that there should be, “an utter disregard of what the 
consequences of the act in question may be so far as the public are concerned” 
or “recklessness so high as to involve an indifference to the consequences for 
the public generally”.  Lord Osborne then went on to consider and set aside 124
the law on manslaughter, more specifically gross negligence manslaughter, 
although he did not make the type of manslaughter he was referring to explicit 
in his decision. This law was set out in the case of Adomako,  discussed 125
below, and involved ordinary principles of negligence.   126
Lord Osborne described manslaughter as, “fundamentally different” to the law 
of culpable homicide in Scotland. He commented that, in Scotland, there is no 
consideration of the civil laws of delict nor an objective assessment of the 
perpetrator’s conduct.  It could be considered that Lord Osborne’s preference 127
for the actus reus and the subjective concept of mens rea is more consistent 
with the requirements for other common law criminal offences in Scots law.  
1.4.2. The directing mind and will of a company  
Lord Osborne then discussed the nature of an incorporated body and its 
implications. The implication of a company being a corporate “personality” is 
that there are rules of attribution determining when employees’ acts are 
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attributed to the company. These rules may be set out in Articles of Association 
or implied by company law and built upon by the principles of agency and 
vicarious liability. How criminal law applies to a company is a matter of 
interpretation and the question to ask is, “whose act (or knowledge, or state of 
mind) was for this purpose intended to count as the act etc. of the 
company?”  The answer was the, “directing mind and will of the 128
company.”  He commented that no such rules of attribution existed in 129
Scotland that would allow a company to be prosecuted for a crime requiring an 
actus reus and mens rea so the English position was considered.   130
In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v. Nattrass, Lord Reid had said of a company’s 
‘directing mind and will’: 
Normally the board of directors, the managing director and perhaps other 
superior officers of a company carry out the functions of management 
and speak and act as the company. Their subordinates do not. They carry 
out orders from above and it can make no difference that they are given 
some measure of discretion. But the board of directors may delegate 
some part of their functions of management giving to their delegate full 
discretion to act independently of instructions from them. I see no 
difficulty in holding that they have thereby put such a delegate in their 
place so that within the scope of the delegation he can act as the 
company. It may not always be easy to draw the line but there are cases 
in which the line must be drawn ….If the guilty man was in law 131
identifiable with the company then whether his offence was serious or 
venial his act was the act of the company but if he was not so identifiable 
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then no act of his, serious or otherwise, was the act of the company 
itself.  132
Lord Osborne considered the developments in English law as regards the 
directing mind and will of the company. In particular, El Ajou v. Dollar Land 
Holdings plc and another held that it:  
…was not necessarily that of the person or persons who had general 
management and control of the company, since the directing mind and 
will could be found in different persons in respect of different activities. 
It was therefore necessary to identify the person who had management 
and control in relation to the act or omission in point. That person 
himself need not be a director of the company.  133
Further, Lord  Osborne considered that R v. HM Coroner for East Kent and 
Others conveyed that a company could be guilty of culpable homicide where 
the actus reus and mens rea of the offence could be established against those 
who were the embodiment of the company rather than those who acted for or in 
its name.  He concluded that the directing mind and will of a company must 134
be, “in relation to the subject-matter of the action in question, responsible to no 
superior in the company and charged with that responsibility himself.”  135
Despite the seeming recognition in El Ajou  and Tesco Supermarkets  that 136 137
the ‘directing mind’ need not be company directors, the definition could be 
considered to have applied to a very limited set of people in reality. Indeed, it 
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has been said that, “By definition, the controlling mind of a company can only 
be formed by its most senior officers: the Board of Directors.”  This appears 138
consistent with Lord Osborne’s formulation, which, does not seem to 
acknowledge delegation. 
It has been said that the test ignored the reality that companies’ structures can 
be multi-tiered and complex. It may be that decisions or acts which led to the 
victim’s death had been made by senior managers underneath directors in the 
company hierarchy. However, proving a link between the managers’ decisions 
or acts and the directors’ recklessness, which takes into account the state of 
their knowledge and fault, was difficult.  A converse view may be that 139
restricting the definition in this way is acceptable as other employees may not 
have foreseen or thought they were signing up to this level of accountability.  
Another issue with the test is that it was also thought to make it virtually 
impossible for the Crown to secure a conviction except in cases involving 
small companies with simple corporate structures.  It is thought, at least in 140
theory, that it should have been “quite simple” for the Crown to secure a 
conviction against small companies whilst larger companies with more 
complex structures and several offices escape prosecution. This discrimination 
faced by smaller companies is said to engage Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights  which prohibits status-based discrimination.  141
1.4.3. Aggregation  
In contrast with the 2007 Act, which, allows for aggregation of the components 
of culpable homicide between different persons, Transco conveyed that the 
actus reus and mens rea could not be aggregated to allow evidence against one 
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individual to strengthen that against another.  Lord Osborne considered R v. 142
Great Western Trains Co Ltd which held that, “the ingredients of culpable 
homicide would have to be established against an individual before the 
company could be convicted.”  In addition, “there is no authority for the 143
application of any doctrine of aggregation of fault in corporate 
manslaughter.”  144
The need to identify an office holder as being responsible for the offence is 
known as the identification principle. It differs from aggregation in as much as 
one person must display the actus reus and mens rea for the offence instead of 
the two components being found in different individuals. It may be considered 
that the exclusion of aggregation was fairer to companies as the concept is not 
in keeping with other areas of criminal law where one individual must possess 
both the mens rea and actus reus. However, an alternative view is that, as 
aggregation allows for the separate components of culpable homicide to be 
considered where they have occurred over a period of time, not to allow it 
would mean that, “the longer some management failure has continued until it 
causes death, the less likely it is that the organisation will be prosecuted.”  145
It could be considered that holding aggregation could not apply may have made 
prosecuting such cases more difficult for the Crown as there may have been 
issues concerning insufficiency of evidence. For example, the Crown may not 
have had sufficient evidence of identification as it may have been difficult to 
tie the actus reus and mens rea of the offence to one particular individual. 
However, an alternative view is that, in light of the 2007 Act allowing for 
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aggregation, the Crown are still left with evidential difficulties if managers 
differed either in their acts or states of knowledge.   146
In his summing up, Lord Osborne added that the Health and Safety at Work etc 
Act 1974 provides for an unlimited financial penalty, which, may be 
considered sufficient in cases like this. It would be for Parliament to legislate to 
effect a change in the law if it felt cases like this should have the moral 
opprobrium connected to a conviction of culpable homicide.  However, it has 147
been commented that the families of the deceased do not share the view that a 
purely financial penalty suffices in such cases and, indeed, the more 
appropriate conviction in such a case would be one of culpable homicide.   148
1.5 Conclusion  
The general overall framework of homicide in Scotland provided in this 
chapter illustrates that, incorporated into the term ‘homicide’, are the common 
law crimes of murder and culpable homicide and the statutory offences of 
causing death whilst on the roads and in the workplace. The common law 
offences of murder and culpable homicide share an actus reus but differ in 
terms of mens rea. The Road Traffic Act 1988 provides a plethora of offences 
connected with causing death whilst driving, some requiring mens rea and 
some strict liability. Causing death by careless driving is unusual in that the 
mens rea is one of negligence. The more recent statute, the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, is similar in that respect as it 
considers whether the directors have breached their duty of care with regard 
given to duties under the law of negligence. Like the Road Traffic Act 1988, 
the CMCHA 2007 can been seen as an example of how homicide law has 
evolved to include specialist legislation aimed at addressing gaps in the law 
caused by changes in society. An examination of the other laws on homicide 
reveals that they do not adequately address instances of death caused in the 
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workplace and the CMCHA 2007 aims to do so. The comparable legal 
framework in England and Wales will now be examined.  
!33
Chapter 2: The Position in England and Wales 
2.0 Introduction  
This chapter examines the comparative law of homicide in England. There is a 
consideration of the law on gross negligence manslaughter prior to the 
CMCHA 2007, which, is seen in Adomako.  The English case of R v. Mark  149 150
is considered in order to provide a comparative example to Transco.  The 151
difficulties in defining gross negligence manslaughter, especially with 
reference the term ‘recklessness’, is noted throughout. There will then be a 
brief discussion of the UK policy considerations used as justification for 
change in the law.   
2.1 The Position in England and Wales   
2.1.1 Murder and Involuntary Manslaughter  
In England and Wales, the law on homicide has a concept of murder, which, 
provides the mens rea as an intention to kill or do serious bodily harm. To 
convict of murder, the jury must be “sure that death or serious bodily harm had 
been a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the 
defendant's actions and that the defendant had appreciated that such was the 
case.”   152
In terms of fair labelling, Gibson has questioned whether killings involving an 
intention to do serious bodily harm should be considered murder or should be 
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categorised as a separate offence.  His view is that it may be easier to accept 153
that a virtual certainty of death, rather than a virtual certainty of serious bodily 
harm, justifies the label of murder. The former means the death is, “foreseen as 
inevitable” whereas the latter may involve no intention or foreseeability of 
death at all.  154
Of less seriousness in the law of homicide, is the concept of involuntary 
manslaughter, which, like the Scottish concept of culpable homicide, is divided 
into ‘types’. There is ‘unlawful act’ manslaughter, ‘reckless manslaughter’ and 
‘gross negligence manslaughter’. The ‘unlawful act’ type occurs when any 
dangerous criminal act results in the victim’s death and the mens rea is that of 
the underlying offence.  ‘Reckless manslaughter’ occurs where an act or 155
omission causes the victim’s death. The mens rea is that the perpetrator was 
aware of a risk of death or serious injury occurring and he took the risk without 
relevant justification.  The law on gross negligence manslaughter prior to the 156
2007 Act was set out in the case of Adomako.  157
2.1.2. Gross Negligence Manslaughter   
The objective test for gross negligence manslaughter from Adomako  was: 158
 …the ordinary principles of the law of negligence apply to ascertain 
whether or not the defendant has been in breach of a duty of care towards 
the victim who has died. If such breach of duty is established the next 
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question is whether that breach of duty caused the death of the victim. If 
so, the jury must go on to consider whether that breach of duty should be 
characterised as gross negligence and therefore as a crime. This will 
depend on the seriousness of the breach of duty committed by the 
defendant in all the circumstances in which the defendant was placed 
when it occurred. The jury will have to consider whether the extent to 
which the defendant's conduct departed from the proper standard of care 
incumbent upon him, involving as it must have done a risk of death to the 
(victim), was such that it should be judged criminal.  159
It could be considered unusual that the crime of gross negligence manslaughter 
was and remains heavily influenced the civil law of tort. There are elements of 
the Adomako test  which are worth looking at in more detail such as the duty 160
of care, causation and grossness.     
Under the law of tort, there is a duty of reasonable care to avoid acts or 
omissions one can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure one’s 
“neighbour”. ‘Neighbours’ are people so closely and directly affected by the 
perpetrator’s acts or omissions that he should have had them in contemplation 
when directing his mind to same.  The concept of being one’s ‘neighbour’ 161
can be created by statue  or the existence of implied or contractual 162
relations.  163
In respect of causation, Lord Woolf said that in unlawful act and gross 
negligence manslaughter, it is an “essential ingredient” that the unlawful or 
negligent act causes the death. He said, “If there is a situation where, on 
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examination of the evidence, it cannot be said that the death in question was 
caused by an act which was unlawful or negligent…then a critical link in the 
chain of causation is not established. That being so, a verdict of unlawful 
killing would not be appropriate and should not be left to the jury.”   164
There is no need for the negligent act or omission to be the main or sole cause 
of the victim’s death.  However, the act must be a “significant 165
contribution”  and a negligent failure to act must be a “substantial” cause of 166
the death.  The act or omission must be, “more than minimally negligibly or 167
trivially contributed to the death”.  A ‘chain of causation’ can be broken by an 168
intervening act if it is the sole cause of the victim’s death and this relieves the 
original defendant of liability.  One example of such an intervening act is 169
where the act of the victim is outwith the range of responses that may be 
anticipated from a victim in his situation. In a case where the victim had died 
following an assault, Stephenson L.J said:   
The test is: Was it the natural result of what the alleged assailant said and 
did, in the sense that it was something that could reasonably have been 
foreseen as the consequence of what he was saying or doing? As it was 
put in one of the old cases, it had got to be shown to be his act, and if of 
course the victim does something so “daft,” in the words of the appellant 
in this case, or so unexpected, not not that this particular assailant did not 
actually foresee it but that no reasonable man could be expected to 
foresee it, then it is only in a very remote and unreal sense a consequence 
of his assault, it is really occasioned by a voluntary act on the part of the 
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victim which could not reasonably be foreseen and which breaks the 
chain of causation between the assault and the harm or injury.  170
In respect of grossness, it was said in the Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 
of 1999), “Although there may be cases where the defendants state of mind is 
relevant to the jury’s consideration when assessing the grossness and 
criminality of his conduct, evidence of his state of mind is not a prerequisite to 
a conviction for manslaughter by gross negligence. The Adomako test is 
objective, but a defendant is who is reckless may well be the more readily 
found to be grossly negligent to a criminal degree.”  171
It is unclear, however, if this was actually the proposition put forward in 
Adomako.  In Adomako, Lord Mackay of Clashfern stated, “I consider it 172
perfectly appropriate that the word 'reckless' should be used in cases of 
involuntary manslaughter, but as Lord Atkin put it 'in the ordinary connotation 
of that word.’"  He said that examples in which this had been done, “with 173
complete accuracy” were in R v. Stone and Dobinson  and R v. West London 174
Coroner ex parte Gray.  These two cases conveyed that ‘recklessness’ 175
involved cases where: an obvious and serious risk to the victim’s health and 
welfare existed, the perpetrator was indifferent to the risk or, recognising that 
the risk existed, he deliberately chose to run it by doing nothing about it.   176
It could be considered that it is unclear whether Lord Mackay is discussing 
involuntary manslaughter generally and is referring to the ‘recklessness’ type, 
whether he intended to infer that recklessness should be considered in 
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determining whether the negligence was gross or whether he is providing an 
alternative subjective mens rea. An example of how the law operated prior to 
the 2007 Act is seen in R. v Mark.  177
2.2 R v. Mark 
R v. Mark  was an appeal which arose in the same year as Transco.  Mr 178 179
Mark was the managing director of his company, National Heating Services. 
The company and Mr Mark were both convicted of manslaughter having 
previously pled guilty to contraventions of HASWA 1974 s 33.  The company 180
was a mechanical service engineers and specialised in heating, ventilation 
engineering, installation and repair.   181
Some years prior to the incident Mr Mark and Mr Smith, an engineer, had 
cleaned a tank owned by Princess Yachts. The cleaning involved Mr Smith and 
others entering the tank and using acetone-soaked rags to remove resin from 
the inside. This went without incident and no-one seemed to realise the dangers 
involved.   182
In 2002, Nationwide Heating Services Ltd was contracted to clean the same 
tank. Mr Mark signed up to a code of practice and, in compliance with the 
regulations, he carried out a risk assessment. It made no mention of the risks of 
using acetone.  However, Mr Mark later sent Princess Yachts a quotation 183
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mentioning acetone and unspecified equipment  and they did not make any 184
enquires about this.  185
Upon visiting the tank, Mr Mark thought it was clean enough whilst Mr Smith 
thought there was a residue of resin that should be removed. Mr Smith said that 
a bucket of acetone should be poured in whilst Mr Mark thought acetone-
soaked rags should be used.   186
On the day the tank was due to be cleaned, the contract was carried out by Mr 
Jarvis, Mr Pinkham,  who was an apprentice,  and Mr Smith. Princess 187 188
Yachts’ new entry pass system was defective and there was no agreement 
regarding a safe system of working for contractors. The men collected 
equipment, including a force-fed air mask, from the charge hand’s office 
without showing a work permit. A supervisor at Princess Yachts intervened and 
insisted a proper connection to the mask and a work permit be obtained. Mr 
Jarvis wore the mask and splashed acetone around the tank. Upon taking the 
mask off, around one and a half hours later, he was almost overcome by the 
fumes. Acetone was then swept up the sides of the tank. Unfortunately, when 
Mr Pinkham was inside the tank, he knocked over a halogen light causing an 
explosion.  He suffered extensive burns from which he subsequently died.    189 190
Mr Mark arrived afterwards and was overheard saying he would also have used 
acetone.  It was submitted on the applicants' behalf that any negligence on 191
their part was insufficient to amount to gross negligence. The applicants were 
not specialists in the cleaning of resin tanks and Mr Mark had previously 
cleaned the tank with acetone. There was also the issue of causation in that Mr 
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Jarvis had splashed the interior of the tank with acetone and there were 
substantial defects in the safety procedures of Princess Yachts.  The sole issue 192
in the appeal against conviction was that Mr Mark had not appreciated the risks 
of using acetone. The defence contended that the trial judge’s direction to the 
jury that, “…actual foresight or perception of the risk is not a prerequisite of 
the crime of gross negligence” was an incorrect statement of law.  193
Adomako  should be revisited as the courts now know recklessness was not as 194
it was in Caldwell  and Lawrence.  However, in the appeal, Lord Justice 195 196
Scott Baker agreed with the trial judge’s  directions and refused leave to 197
appeal.  198
In describing gross negligence manslaughter, the trial judge, Bean J., had given 
the objective definition and appeared to define grossness as, “the defendants' 
conduct not only created a serious and obvious risk of death, but also fell so far 
below the standards reasonably to be expected of the defendants as to be 
grossly negligent and thus criminal.”   199
Lord Justice Scott Baker said that Bean J.:  
…pointed out that it was not disputed Mr Mark and his company owed 
Ben Pinkham a duty to take reasonable care for his safety. As to breach of 
duty, it was the Crown's case that acetone should never have been 
introduced into the tank because there was no safe way of using it, even 
with knowledge of its properties. He advised the jury to put aside the 
evidence relating to the nature and condition of the light. The thrust of 
 ibid [16] (Lord Justice Scott Baker)192
 ibid [23] (Lord Justice Scott Baker) citing [9c] Bean J 193
 ibid [29] (Lord Justice Baker) citing R v. Adomako [1995] 1 A.C. 171 194
 ibid [29] (Lord Justice Baker) citing R. Caldwell [1982] AC 341195
 ibid [29] (Lord Justice Baker) citing R v. Lawrence [1982] AC 510196
 ibid [25] (Lord Justice Scott Baker)197
 ibid [33] (Lord Justice Scott Baker)198
 ibid [18] (Lord Justice Scott Baker)199
!41
the case was the negligent use of acetone. Breach of duty of care had to 
be viewed objectively against the standards of a reasonable employer. 
Would a reasonably competent employer, having contracted for the task 
of cleaning a tank, have permitted the use of acetone within it? The judge 
also pointed out that the deficiencies in the system were, to a large extent, 
recognised by the pleas of guilty to the health and safety offences.   200
It could  be considered that the result in this case is understandable considering 
that Mr Mark held himself out as expert in a company dealing with the 
cleaning of tanks, the company failed to institute safe working practices and 
the use of the halogen lamp and acetone together constituted unsafe working 
practices. Although an accepted use for industrial grade acetone is the thinning 
of resins, as a highly flammable liquid, it should be treated with care and this 
includes being kept away from high temperatures and open flames.   201
Separately, it appears that, not only could both charges on the indictment result 
in a conviction but, following Bean J., a plea to the breach of HASWA 1974 
seemed to facilitate or encourage a conviction on the corporate manslaughter 
charge. This differs from the Scottish position seen in Transco  where, by 202
virtue of the corporate homicide and the HASWA 1974 charges appearing on 
the indictment as alternatives,  only one charge of the two was ever going to 203
result in a conviction. It could be considered that this presents an unfair and 
unequal approach in the two countries. 
Like the position in Scotland, the court in England were informed by the trial 
judge that they must not aggregate other mistakes Mr Mark made.  Also like 204
the position in Scotland, the identification doctrine was used to identify Mr 
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Mark as the directing mind of the company, although this was not made 
explicit. Lord Justice Scott Baker said the trial judge: 
 …told the jury that the prosecution had to prove four things: (1) that the 
defendant owed a duty of care to the deceased; (2) that the defendant was 
in breach of that duty in failing to take reasonable care, i.e. was 
negligent; (3) that this breach caused the death of the victim; and (4) that 
the defendants' conduct not only created a serious and obvious risk of 
death, but also fell so far below the standards reasonably to be expected 
of the defendants as to be grossly negligent and thus criminal.  205
In Mark, in respect of the term, ‘gross’ Bean J. had said: 
First there must have been an obvious and serious risk of death. This 
again must be assessed objectively, regardless of what risk was perceived 
by the defendants. On the basis that the consequence of the negligent 
conduct has been the introduction of a volatile liquid into an enclosed 
space within which the employee is working whereby all or part of that 
space contain an explosive mixture of gases which can be ignited by a 
heat source or a spark, it may be that the risk of death can be readily 
assessed as serious. But was it obvious to a reasonably competent 
employer professing any skills claimed by the defendants?  206
Bean J. said to the jury: 
 …What does ‘gross’ mean? It has to be exceptionally bad, in the sense 
of being blatant or flagrant. Perhaps a better adjective that ought to assist 
you in getting to grips with what grossly negligent conduct involves is 
the word ‘reckless’. They are not synonymous, but they overlap. To act 
recklessly is something I suspect I do not have to elaborate on. It 
certainly means, for present purposes, that in circumstances where there 
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is an obvious and serious risk of death, a defendant was either indifferent 
to that risk — i.e. he demonstrated he couldn't care less about it — or, 
having recognised the risk, deliberately chose to run it.  207
The aspect of their being overlap between the terms ‘gross negligence’ and 
‘recklessness’ appears to have been the basis of the defence agent’s objection to 
the decision in the trial.  Indeed, this has been a long-standing issue in the 208
law. The Law Commission have said that the term ‘reckless’ began to be used 
by judges to convey a high degree of negligence as they found the term ‘gross 
negligence’, “unwieldy and difficult to explain to juries.”  209
The difficulties with defining ‘grossness’ seemed to begin in the early 
landmark case of Bateman,  which, provided a definition of gross negligence 210
largely in line with the one we see in Adomako.  However, when it came to 211
trying to define ‘grossness’, the Lord Chief Justice said:  
In explaining to juries the test which they should apply to determine 
whether the negligence, in the particular case, amounted or did not 
amount to a crime, judges have used many epithets, such as “culpable,” 
“criminal,” “gross,” “wicked,” “clear,” “complete.” But, whatever epithet 
be used and whether an epithet be used or not, in order to establish 
criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, 
the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of 
compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life 
and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct 
deserving punishment.  212
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Despite the attempt to clarify ‘grossness’ by providing words that may be 
interchangeable, the proposition from this decision seems to be the same as we 
see in Adomako  - the accused can be convicted of a crime if his behaviour is 213
criminal. Like the definition in Adomako,  this has been critiqued for its 214
circularity  and uncertainty caused by inconsistent application by juries.  It 215 216
could also be considered that the need for interchangeable words to be 
provided, in itself, demonstrates a lack of clarity and certainty.  
After Bateman  and prior to Adomako,  the difficulties in effectively 217 218
articulating ‘grossness’ led to judges gradually changing the law.  Judges, 219
post-Bateman,  began to use ‘recklessness’ to covey a high degree of 220
negligence.  However, some cases, such as Stone v. Dobinson’s  provision 221 222
of a detailed description of ‘recklessness’ was viewed as going “further" than 
that.  The culmination of these changes was the case of R v. Seymour  223 224
which confirmed that ‘recklessness’ was to be employed instead of gross 
negligence. 
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The courts had first begun to use the test of ‘recklessness’ instead of ‘gross 
negligence’  after Bateman.  In essence, this case effected a shift away from 225 226
using recklessness to define ‘grossness’ and, instead, it was used as the test to 
be employed instead of gross negligence.  These changes culminated in 227
Seymour,  which, was a case of reckless driving. 228
Seymour held that the term to be employed was ‘recklessness’  and it was 229
defined by Lord Roskill following consideration of the cases R v. Caldwell  230
and R v. Lawrence.  He provided:  231
First, that the defendant was in fact driving the vehicle in such a manner 
as to create an obvious and serious risk of causing physical injury to 
some other person who might happen to be using the road ... and Second, 
that in driving in that manner the defendant did so without having given 
any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or, having 
recognised that there was some risk involved, had nonetheless gone on to 
take it.   232
This definition was employed by judges fairly consistently for around 10 
years.  The Law Commission of England and Wales said that Seymour:  233
 Law Commission (n 209) para 2.11 citing Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576; Larkin [1943] 1 All 225
ER 217 [219D] (Humphreys J); Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981 [990] (Sachs LJ) Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110 
[114] (Lord Widgery CJ.)
 R v. Bateman (n 210)226
 Law Commission (n 209) para 2.11 227
 R v. Seymour (n 224)228
 R v. Seymour (n 224) [500] (Lord Fraser of Tullybelton) citing Jennings [1983] 1 A.C. 624 229
[644]-[645] (Lord Roskill)
 R v. Seymour (n 224) [502] (Lord Roskill) citing R. v Caldwell [1982] AC 341230
 ibid [503] (Lord Roskill) citing R v. Lawrence [1982] AC 510231
 R v. Seymour (n 224) [503] (Lord Roskill) citing R. Lawrence [1982] A.C. 510 [526]-[527] 232
(Lord Diplock)
 Law Commission (n 209) para 2.14 citing Kong Cheuk Kwan (1985) 82 Cr App R 18; Madigan 233
(1982) 75 Cr App R 145, Goodfellow (1986) 83 Cr App R 23; Consultation Paper No 135 paras 
3.110 – 3.118. 
!46
…went some way towards removing the uncertainty that had previously 
characterised the law. However, this certainty was bought at the cost of 
widening the basis of liability and introducing a degree of rigidity into 
the way in which juries were directed. … Under the Seymour rule, once 234
the defendant had been shown by her conduct to have created an obvious 
and serious risk of causing physical injury to some other person, it was 
open to the jury to find her guilty whether her conduct was a result of 
mere inadvertence, conscious risk-taking or poor judgment. It was not 
longer open to a defendant to dispute guilt on the ground that her 
negligence had not been “gross”.  235
It could be considered, however, that the uncertainty in the law would have 
persisted to the extent that, in some cases, concepts of ‘gross negligence’ were 
still utilised.  It can also be observed that widening liability, axiomatically, 236
may have aided the Crown in securing a conviction. Showing the defendant’s 
inadvertence, conscious risk-taking or poor judgement would seem to a lower 
threshold for guilt to be established than having to show the defendant’s 
negligence was gross. However, a converse view may be that Seymour  237
seems to provide a subjective test, which, can increase the difficulty for the 
Crown in securing convictions as it is impossible to see into the mind of the 
defendant and establish their intention at the material time.  
The case of Adomako  was the next landmark case concerning this issue and 238
Lord Mackay clarified that the objective test for gross negligence was the one 
to be employed in manslaughter cases involving a breach of duty.  According 239
to the Law Commission of England and Wales, Lord Mackay’s “decision 
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resolved the principal uncertainty in the law – whether the test of Bateman 
gross negligence or of Caldwell recklessness should be applied.”  However, 240
this is subject to the aforementioned disclarity surrounding Lord Mackay’s 
comments on recklessness in his judgement. The Law Commission said, “It 
also restored to the law the flexibility of the Bateman gross negligence test, 
which allowed the jury to consider the accused’s conduct in all the surrounding 
circumstances, and only punished her if her negligence was very serious.”    241
However, Gibson more recently intimated his belief that there is still no 
sufficient guidance on how to characterise the grossness of negligence and this 
may lead to issues of fair labelling. Inappropriate labelling may occur on the 
basis that juries may differ in their interpretations and, ultimately, their 
verdicts. He said it may also be the case that different verdicts may be arrived 
at on the basis of similar facts.  It could be considered, however, that the 242
2007 Act’s provision of a host of factors the jury must consider when 
determining whether there was a, “gross breach” negates this difficulty to some 
degree.    
Returning to R v. Mark, Lord Justice Baker Scott said: 
The judge then observed that acting recklessly is not the same as gross 
negligence… For instance, a defendant might appreciate a risk and intend 
to avoid it but show such a high degree of negligence as to justify its 
categorisation as gross. But, he noted, this was not a case where the 
prosecution was saying that the appellant had acted recklessly or even 
very negligently by reason of having recognised the risk, let alone the 
serious and obvious risk of death.  243
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Lord Justice Baker Scott referred to Bean J.’s directions: 
…perception of the risk might be a strong factor in favour of the 
prosecution. Non-perception of the risk, as here, might be a strong factor 
against categorising his conduct as grossly negligent, but, he added, “it 
might be different if the defendant had simply turned a blind eye to the 
obvious”. He then concluded his directions on the law with these 
words,“Equally you may feel that where a person has acted, if you think 
that may be the case here, without having perceived the risk in the first 
place, that might be a strong factor against categorising his conduct as 
grossly negligent.”  244
It could be considered that this is an approach that facilitates the Crown as, 
essentially, no subjective perception of the risk is needed for gross negligence 
to exist but its existence contributes towards proof of gross negligence.   
2.3 Statutory Reform  
When the UK Parliament was considering reforming the law to introduce the 
CMCHA 2007, their approach was influenced by the recommendations made 
by the Law Commission of England and Wales in 1996.  The Law 245
Commission had considered there to be several drivers for reform, one of 
which was public opinion  following a series of high profile disasters. These 246
included the Piper Alpha platform disaster which resulted in 167 deaths  and 247
the Clapham rail crash which resulted in 35 deaths and almost 500 injuries.  248
In both cases, it was recognised that, respectively, the platform operator and 
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those in the higher echelons of British Rail rather than employees at ground 
level were at fault.  249
It was also recognised that many people were dying from industrial incidents  250
and these deaths could and should be preventable.  Despite the number of 251
incidents, levels of prosecutions were low and most prosecutions were 
unsuccessful. At that time, there had only been one successful prosecution 
involving a one-man company.  252
In the intervening period between the Law Commission’s proposals for reform 
and the enactment of the 2007 Act, in England, this situation seems to have 
improved and more prosecutions for gross negligence manslaughter over the 
years have been successful.  253
2.4 Conclusion  
It can be seen that the English law has developed in a different way to the law 
in Scotland prior to the CMCHA 2007. In particular, England, unlike Scotland, 
already had a notion of gross negligence manslaughter albeit there were 
difficulties in how the terms gross negligence and recklessness were to be used. 
It can be observed that Scottish law prior to the CMCHA 2007 does not 
facilitate the Crown in obtaining a prosecution whereas the English law does so 
in different ways. The policy discussions surrounding the change in law seem 
reactionary in relation to high profile disasters, the need to eradicate difficulties 
posed by the identification doctrine and to hold managers sufficiently 
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accountable for workplace incidents. The effectiveness of the CMCHA 2007 
will now be considered.       
!51
Chapter 3: The Effectiveness of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007 
3.0 Introduction  
This chapter explores the reasons behind the introduction of the CMCHA 2007 
and highlights the problems with the prior law. Since the 2007 Act’s 
introduction, there have been no prosecutions for corporate homicide in 
Scotland.  Indeed, it appears that cases which appear suitable for prosecution 254
under the Act, such as the cases of ICL Plastics  and Enva Scotland Ltd,  255 256
are being dealt with under the HASWA 1974 instead. However, there have 
been 22 prosecuted cases of corporate manslaughter in England, all but one 
unreported.   257
The chapter examines the reasons behind the 2007 Act and how the verdicts in 
these English cases have been arrived at. It then considers the factors which 
were instrumental in allowing the Judges to reach their decisions and notes the 
wider disparities in the Judges’ approach when these cases are considered 
overall. Finally, it examines the main focus of critique of the CMCHA 2007 - 
the senior management test - and attempts to establish whether these critiques 
hold up to scrutiny. 
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3.1 The Reasons Behind the CMCHA 2007 
Historically, barriers to prosecution arising from the common law across 
England and Scotland pertained to; the identification doctrine, the consequent 
lack of aggregation and Crown immunity from prosecution. 
Prior to the 2007 Act, the ‘identification doctrine’ was described as a, “major 
difficulty that has to be overcome”.  This was because it was extremely 258
difficult to pinpoint those who were the embodiment of the company as, 
according to one commentator, “the more diffuse the company structure, and 
the more devolved the powers that are given to semi-autonomous managers, 
the easier it will be to avoid liability.”  It was also said that a manager’s 259
individual liability was, “a narrow and artificial basis for assessing corporate 
negligence.”  260
Linked to this was the difficulty posed by the practice of de-centralising safety 
services. One example of this was in the pharmaceutical sector where 
companies were using contract laboratories to conduct safety research thereby 
transferring responsibility to them.  It was noted that, “If responsibility for 261
the development of safety monitoring is not vested in a particular group or 
individual, it becomes almost impossible to identify the “directing mind” for 
whose shortcomings the company can be liable.”  It could be considered that 262
this is mitigated in the 2007 Act to the extent that inappropriate delegation for 
safety issues may be considered a breach by senior managers in itself.  263
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 ibid 1.17 citing Celia Wells, “Manslaughter and Corporate Crime” (1989) 139 NLJ 931259
 HL Deb 19 December 2006, vol 687, col 1897260
 Law Commission (n 209) 1.17 citing S Field and N Jörg, “Corporate Liability and 261
Manslaughter: should we be going Dutch?” [1991] Crim LR 156, 158–159  
 Law Commission (n 209) 1.17262
 Simon Parsons, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 Ten Years On: 263
Fit for Purpose?’ The Journal of Criminal Law [2018] 82(4), 305, 307      
!53
It was recognised that changes should be made in the law which hold blame-
worthy employers accountable whilst individual junior employees should not 
be considered liable.  However, there was also a need to balance employer’s 264
liability with safeguarding against situations where companies were being 
unduly convicted purely by virtue of being in charge at the time when a fatality 
occurred.  265
It was hoped that creating a new offence of corporate homicide/manslaughter 
meant a new approach that, effectively shifted the emphasis away from looking 
at individual liability towards a collective management failure. This was 
thought to ensure fairness as it would not place the blame of a corporation on 
to one person’s shoulders.  It would also provide justice for the victim’s 266
family as it would be recognised that what happened was not just a regulatory 
breach but homicide and appropriate sanctions would apply.  267
It has been noted that a further issue arising with the common law is Crown 
immunity from prosecution. Thereby, government departments, civil servants 
and Ministers escape liability for prosecution under the English  and Scottish 268
respective common laws of corporate manslaughter and corporate homicide. It 
was felt this showed an unfair and discriminatory preference towards the 
Crown  and this immunity should be abolished. There were also feelings at 269
Westminster that exemptions to the lift on immunity should apply but it would 
not be easy to establish exactly what these should be.  270
In Scotland, under the common law, there was the added difficulty arising from 
the Crown having to establish a subjective mens rea. It was noted that it may 
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be difficult to identify senior individuals with a sufficient level of direct 
involvement to allow their states of mind to constitute the organisation’s mens 
rea.  It could be considered, at least in theory as we do not have any 271
successful Scottish prosecutions to illustrate this point, that the objective test 
for gross negligence set out in the 2007 Act mitigates this. 
In 2005, the Scottish Executive set up an Expert Group to review the law on 
corporate homicide. The group published a report which envisaged a number of 
changes made only to the law of Scotland as opposed to the UK as a whole.  272
However, no Bill was passed as a result of this and the next development came 
from Westminster in the form of the 2007 Act, which, aimed to address these 
issues.  273
In 2018, the Scottish Parliament published the Culpable Homicide (Scotland) 
Bill Consultation Paper. This seems to be a misnomer as the Bill envisages 
changes to the law on corporate homicide rather than culpable homicide 
generally. Although it suggests new legislative provisions in respect of deaths 
caused by a “natural person”,  it is unclear if the proposed changes are 274
intended to apply beyond a commercial context. Indeed, given that terms such 
as “natural person” has commercial connotations, it can be supposed that they 
are not.  
This Consultation Paper ignores the fact that the CMCHA 2007 has superseded 
Transco  as it identifies several problems in what it calls the “existing 275
common-law” and “the current law”  and references Transco in relation to 276
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these.  It could be considered that the CMCHA 2007 has rectified the issues 277
raised pertaining to Transco.  Additionally, it states that the criterion for 278
culpable homicide is not clear and there should be well defined categories of 
corporate manslaughter. The alternative mens rea could be gross negligence as 
it is currently defined by the CMCHA 2007  or recklessness as defined by the 279
draft Scottish Criminal Code.  This defines recklessness as:  280
(a) something is caused recklessly if the person causing the result is, or 
ought to be, aware of an obvious and serious risk that acting will bring 
about the result but nonetheless acts where no reasonable person would 
do so; 
(b) a person is reckless as to a circumstance, or as to a possible result of    
an act, if the person is, or ought to be, aware of an obvious and serious 
risk that the circumstance exists, or that the result will follow, but 
nonetheless acts where no reasonable person would do so; 
(c) a person acts recklessly if the person is, or ought to be, aware of an 
obvious and serious risk of dangers or of possible harmful results in so 
acting but nonetheless acts where no reasonable person would do so.  281
The Paper proposes these categories should be, “in addition to, and not in 
substitution for, the existing kinds of culpable homicide at common law. There 
is an express saving for the common law.”  It could be considered that the 282
addition of the three variations of recklessness to gross negligence 
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manslaughter and the common law categories of culpable homicide  may 283
only unsettle the law and add to the lack of clarity in homicide law generally. 
In addition, to have both mens rea of gross negligence manslaughter and 
recklessness in the context of corporate homicide/manslaughter could also 
potentially rekindle the confusion over how to use the terms as seen from 
English cases post-Bateman  and pre-Adomako.  284 285
The Paper also ignores the fact that the 2007 Act has dispensed with Crown 
immunity from prosecution under common law.  Parsons rightly believes the 286
2007 Act has a wider scope than the prior common law and comments that:  
Calling the offence corporate manslaughter is a misnomer because the 
offence can be committed by other organisations such as trade unions, 
partnerships and public authorities such as the police, the CPS and the 
departments of state.   287
There are, however, sensible exclusions from liability provided to certain 
organisations in certain circumstances under the Act.  288
The Paper was met with challenge at a Justice Committee meeting last year in 
which concerns were raised as to the Scottish Parliament’s legislative 
competence to pass the Bill. In particular, it was thought that the Scottish 
Parliament may be encroaching on matters of health and safety and business 
associations reserved for the UK Parliament.   289
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Most recently, the Scottish Law Commission has announced it is devising a 
Discussion Paper on the mental element in homicide law so future proposals 
for reform may result from that.  290
3.2 The Reasons Behind the Guilty Verdicts 
In 2011, Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd  became the first company to 291
be charged with  and convicted after trial of corporate manslaughter under the 292
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 s 1(1).  The 293
company’s application for appeal against conviction and sentence were 
refused.  294
The small company was primarily concerned in soil investigation and its one 
director, Mr Eaton, had total control of the ways in which its affairs were 
managed and the work was organised. There were eight employees, however, 
Mr Eaton and the deceased, a geologist, were the only two people who carried 
out soil investigations.  The deceased entered a pit that subsequently 295
collapsed and he died from asphyxiation.  Mr Eaton had been charged with 296
gross negligence manslaughter but this charge was permanently stayed by the 
Crown due to his ill-health.  The company was fined £385,000.  The Crown 297 298
had argued that the company should have strictly prohibited employees from 
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entering unsupported pits deeper than 1.2 meters and, in not doing so, the 
company had grossly breached its duty of care.   299
In an argument that could be considered to exemplify the elasticity that still 
exists in the term ‘gross’, the defence had argued that, if the company had 
breached its duty of care, the breach was not gross. It was reasonable to leave 
the issue of pit safety to Mr Eaton’s discretion given that he was highly 
experienced and the deceased was qualified. It had been further argued that, if 
the breach was found to be gross upon examination, the cause of death was the 
fact that the deceased had entered the pit unsupervised contrary to the 
company’s practices.  The Crown had argued that there had been a gross 300
breach in any event as, in essence, there was a system of work whereby the 
employer and deceased entered dangerous, unsupported pits.  301
On appeal, Lord Judge C.J. stated, “The judge found, and we agree, that it was 
plainly foreseeable that the way in which the company conducted its operations 
could produce not only serious injury but death. The standard by which it fell 
short of its duty of care was found by the jury to have been gross.”  It was 302
noted that the employer had not honoured assurances given to the HSE that pits 
deeper than 1.2 meters would be supported after a previous incident involving 
another employee.  303
It has been noted that, “Some commentators have argued that the Act was not 
designed to prosecute small businesses like Cotswold. However, the case was 
seen as a test case for the legislation…The successful prosecution of Cotswold 
demonstrates the importance for businesses to have a health and safety culture 
and to ensure that everyone takes responsibility for improving health and 
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safety.” It was also thought that larger companies may look to the judgement in 
this case and deduce the risks of non-compliance to their own business.   304
In the cases that followed, common themes emerged as regards the evidencing 
of systematic failures by companies. These themes included a lack of safety 
equipment and precautions that would have prevented the deaths and ensuring 
the employees had adequate supervision, training and qualifications. Other 
themes included companies ignoring previous warnings and advice about 
risks  and machinery being badly maintained, unclean and defective. In most 305
cases, a dim view was taken of companies concerned more with production and 
profits rather than safety.  However, in one case, evidence of this was 306
considered neutral  and, without further information, it is unclear how the 307
Judge arrived at that view. 
Most companies pled guilty to corporate manslaughter, which, resulted in other 
regulatory charges against the company and/or the director either wholly or 
partly being dropped.  In one case, after the company pled guilty to corporate 308
manslaughter and a HASWA offence, a charge of gross negligence 
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 See e.g. R v. Lion Steel Equipment Ltd: Sentencing Remarks (Manchester Crown Court, July 20 305
2012) [20]-[25] (HHJ Gilbert Q.C.); Rod Hunt and Bethan Casinelli, ‘The First Publicity Order, 
And A Company Fined The Entirety Of Its Assets - The Latest Corporate Manslaughter 
Conviction!’ (Clyde & Co, 12 March 2014) <https://www.mondaq.com/uk/corporate-crime/
298846/the-first-publicity-order-and-a-company-fined-the-entirety-of-its-assets--the-latest-
corporate-manslaughter-conviction> accessed 18 July 2020; BBC News, ‘Water sports firm pleads 
guilty to Mari-Simon Cronje death charge’ (22 November 2013) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-london-25056230> accessed 20 July 2020; RSA, ‘Director fined in £183,000 in corporate 
manslaughter case’ <https://www.rsabroker.com/news/director-fined-£183000-corporate-
manslaughter-case> accessed 20 July 2020
 See e.g. Jane Meredith, ‘Reading man fined £191,000 after Calcot man's 2012 death’ (Newbury 306
Today, 27 February 2014) <https://www.newburytoday.co.uk/news/news/10298/reading-man-
fined-191-000-after-calcot-man-s-2012-death.html> accessed 20 July 2020 citing R v. Mobile 
Sweepers (Reading) Ltd (Winchester Crown Court, 26 February 2014) (HHJ Guy Boney); British 
Safety Council, ‘Waste firm Sterecycle fined £500k for corporate manslaughter after autoclave 
explosion’ <https://www.britsafe.org/publications/safety-management-magazine/safety-
management-magazine/2014/waste-firm-sterecycle-fined-500k-for-corporate-manslaughter-after-
autoclave-explosion/> accessed 5 August 2020
 Northumbria University (n 257) citing R. v CAV Aerospace Ltd (Central Crim Court, 31 July 307
2015)
 Northumbria University (n 257) 308
!60
manslaughter against the director was replaced with a HASWA charge.  In 309
another case, after the company pled guilty, weak charges against the two 
directors were dropped and a third fell away at trial.  There were six cases 310
where the company was found guilty of corporate manslaughter after trial.  311
One case involved two companies, where, it appears, one pled guilty and the 
other was found guilty, both, of corporate manslaughter and regulatory 
offences. All directors charged either pled or were found guilty of regulatory 
offences.  There were two acquittals  and one case was dismissed as ‘no 312 313
case to answer’.  314
3.3 The Reasons Behind the Three Acquittals 
R v. PS and JE Ward Ltd  involved a nursery plant operator who died as a 315
result of electrocution when he drove his tractor under live power cables. 
Although the full facts of this case are not available, it appears the acquittal 
was due to the fact that the employee was experienced and trained to drive 
under power cables and he was acting under his own initiative at the time 
rather than in accordance with his employer’s instructions.  Indeed, it was not 316
clear to anyone why he had been in that particular area at the time.  317
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In R v. MNS Mining Ltd,  the company and mine manager were acquitted of 318
four counts, respectively, of corporate manslaughter and gross negligence 
manslaughter following miners perishing in a tunnel flood.  The acquittals 319
were due to the fact that expert evidence showed the mine manager had 
adequately inspected the relevant section of the mine several times prior to the 
incident, the flood water probably accumulated after that and the shot firer who 
breached the mine wall used multiple shots instead of one against the 
manager’s instructions.  It could be viewed that, in these two cases, the 320
correct approach has been taken to the deceaseds’ actions breaking the chain of 
causation. 
In Executive v. Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust, the case was 
dismissed as ‘no case to answer’. The NHS and a consultant anaesthetist were 
acquitted, respectively, of corporate manslaughter and gross negligence 
manslaughter after a fortnight of evidence. This conveyed that the deceased, 
who suffered complications from childbirth, should not have died but there 
were no systematic failures and her statistics had not indicated the need for 
immediate further treatment.   321
Overall, the fact that most of the cases under the 2007 Act have resulted in 
convictions and the few acquittals have been understandable, based upon the 
information available, shows that the Act is effective. It could be considered 
that the acquittals seem understandable as, otherwise, the companies may have 
been convicted of a crime that was unforeseen. The acquittals also fall in with 
the Law Commission’s view that one wishes to avoid situations where 
companies were being unduly convicted purely by virtue of being in charge at 
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the time when a fatality occurred.  However, despite these outcomes, there 322
are some critiques of the 2007 Act.  
3.4 The Concerns about the CMCHA 2007’s Senior Management Test 
It has been stated that the 2007 Act is ineffective as evidenced by the fact that 
there have been no successful prosecutions under it in Scotland to date  and 323
the ‘senior management’ test has been blamed for this.  However, without 324
knowing the Crown’s reasons for the lack of prosecutions, it is difficult to 
attribute this to the lack of effectiveness of the legislation.  
Field states that a point of concern in England is that, since 2015, the rate of 
prosecutions have seemed to slow down, suggesting they may have peaked, 
however, it could be considered it is too early to determine this.  However, a 325
converse view following the acquittals in R v. PS and JE Ward Ltd  and R v. 326
MNS Mining Ltd  was that the Crown was “picking up the pace” in 327
prosecuting such offences and, in doing so, this served as a reminder to 
employers to implement robust health and safety procedures and policies that 
operate at ground level.  328
It has also been stated that the more complex structures of these larger 
companies provides “persistent invulnerability” as it is hard for the Crown to 
show a senior management failure.  This creates an inequality in the law as it 329
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is - at least theoretically - relatively easy for the Crown to convict a small 
company with a simple structure but “extremely difficult” to convict medium 
or large ones.  330
It is true that all companies prosecuted under the Act have been small or micro-
companies with the exception of the medium company, Lion Steel, and the 
medium-large CAV Aerospace.  It is unclear why there have not been more 331
prosecutions of larger companies but the fact the former company pled and the 
latter was convicted after trial  conveys there is no reason similar results 332
cannot be achieved by the Crown in future. It has been said, “While such 
prosecutions remain infrequent, their very initiation suggests that the net of 
liability under the CMCHA 2007 may be widening and that its reach now 
encompasses more than just micro/small companies.”   333
Parsons believes that the 2007 Act’s inclusion of the ‘senior management’ test 
essentially allows for, “…the conduct of all management within a corporation 
to be taken into account when ascertaining whether there were systemic 
failures in respect of safety that caused a death.” He believes this will assist the 
Crown in establishing liability for corporate homicide/manslaughter in relation 
to companies, big and small.  This is in line with Lord McNally’s view, “The 334
new offence allows an organisation’s liability to be assessed on a wider basis, 
providing a more effective means of accountability for very serious 
management failings across the organisation.”   335
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However, Menis states of the test:  
…causation is assessed first on a factual (evidential) level, once this is 
satisfied the question to be considered is a legal one. More specifically, 
the aspects to ascertain are first, whether ‘but for’  the senior 336
management’s gross breach of duty in managing the organisation’s 
activities, the death would not have occurred. Second, although the gross 
breach does not have to be the only or even the main cause of death 
(which may be an action or omission of an employee), it must be 
‘operative and substantial’ at the time of death and must have 
‘significantly contributed’  to the fatal result. The reality, however, is 337
far less technical, and policy considerations  may contribute to 338
strengthen or weaken the ‘chain of causation’.  The evidence, 339
circumstances and understanding of what is ‘gross’ in certain contexts  340
will have a significant impact on the identification of a causal connection 
between the senior management, that is, the way in which the 
organisation’s activities were conducted, and the consequential death. 
These factors will be even more complex when the corporation is 
larger.  341
As regards the comments on causation, the fact that different policy 
considerations, which, are changeable over time, can influence the chain of 
causation may cause unfair and disparate results. It could also be considered 
that the author has acknowledged the dubiety over the definition of ‘grossness’ 
and she seems to indicate that this is still an ongoing issue. However, possibly 
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more corporate homicide/manslaughter trials, and their reporting, would be 
needed in order to establish that.   
Other issues regard the requirement that ‘senior managers’ are individuals with 
a significant role in managing, or making decisions on, how the whole or a 
substantial part of an organisation’s activities are managed.  It appears to 342
narrow the scope of the offence as the role of middle managers must not render 
that of senior managers insubstantial.  It could be considered that it may lead 343
to confusion over who precisely was responsible for the death. It also leads to 
concern that managers may try to inappropriately delegate health and safety to 
middle managers to avoid responsibility, however, such inappropriate 
delegation could, in itself, be considered a gross breach of duty.  344
A converse view is that the ‘senior management’ test, in practice, applies only 
to the board of directors. The test does not reflect the commercial reality that 
managers below directors in the company hierarchy, acting under authority 
delegated by the board of directors, “are the company”  and reform is needed 345
to allow for aggregation.  It could be considered that this is untrue as there 346
have been several cases where the actions of non-directors have resulted in the 
company being successfully prosecuted for corporate manslaughter in England. 
Indeed, R v. MNS Mining Ltd  was the first instance of a non-director’s 347
actions leading to the company being charged with corporate manslaughter. 
Following this, it was commented that it, “may lead to judicial consideration of 
what amounts to “senior management” under the Act.”  It could be 348
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considered that this case conveys that the term is an elastic concept so much so 
that it may have been a case, like Lion Steel  discussed more below, in which 349
the company should never have been charged. In this instance, due to the 
individual responsible not actually being “senior management”. In light of R v. 
MNS Ltd  and PS and JE Ward Ltd,  it was also commented that:  350 351
Individual prosecutions of senior management can assist in bolstering the 
chances of securing a conviction for corporate manslaughter. The recent 
acquittals may lead to prosecutors looking more closely into bringing 
legal proceedings against individual directors and senior management in 
the future.  352
It can be considered that it is not completely clear what the commentator 
means as regards prosecutors “looking more closely” into bringing legal 
proceedings. It can be observed that any willingness from the Crown to 
prosecute obviously has to be tempered to the extent that only sensible 
prosecutions with sufficient evidence against senior management should be 
brought. 
In R v. Sterecycle (Rotherham) Ltd  a former director, a former maintenance 353
manager and a former operations manager were individually charged but these 
were withdrawn at trial. The company was found guilty of corporate 
manslaughter  and it was commented:  354
…One interesting feature of this case is that the prosecution relied not on 
the specified acts of individuals, but on the aggregation of failures 
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throughout the company. This is a basis for prosecution that would not 
have been possible prior to the passing of this Act.  355
Then, in Health and Safety Executive v. Huntley Mount Engineering Ltd,  the 356
company pled guilty to corporate manslaughter and two individuals described 
as “the two most senior managers” pled guilty to HASWA offences having both 
originally been charged with gross negligence manslaughter. One of these 
individuals was the sole director, however, the other was a merely a 
supervisor.  357
Thereafter, was the aforementioned case of Health and Safety Executive v. 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust,  where the individual acquitted 358
was a consultant anaesthetist and, following the acquittal, the Crown was 
unsure whether to continue proceedings against a second consultant who had 
gone abroad.  Due to a lack of information, it is unclear what the outcome of 359
this was.  
The most recent instance of a non-director’s actions resulting in a corporate 
manslaughter charge against a company was in R. v Bilston Skips Ltd.  The 360
company and non-director manager, respectively, were found guilty after trial 
of corporate manslaughter and gross negligence manslaughter after both 
pleading guilty to HASWA offences.  It could be considered that, these 361
English cases show that the “senior management” test is, in reality, extending 
to managers throughout the companies and aggregation is taking place. As this 
is taking place in England, there is no reason why the same should not occur in 
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Scotland. However, it seems that the 2007 Act is even capturing individuals 
who are potentially not the “senior” management legislators had envisaged. 
In addition to cases involving non-directors, Lion Steel  posed a separate 362
problem as, there, it seemed that directors were being unduly prosecuted. Due 
to the complexity of the case, two separate trials were due to take place, one 
involving charges against the directors and one for corporate manslaughter 
against the company.  363
In the first trial, evidential issues in the Crown case meant that two of the three 
directors individually charged with gross negligence manslaughter were 
acquitted on the basis of their being ‘no case to answer’.  It can be considered 364
surprising that one of these directors was a Finance Director who was not 
involved in how the workforce operated and the other was in charge of a sister 
site 50 miles away from the factory the incident occurred in.  It is difficult to 365
fathom the Crown’s justification for bringing charges against these individuals. 
The judge commented that the case against them, “…should never have been 
brought” and the case against the remaining director was, “weak but 
arguable”.  The Crown then agreed to drop the gross negligence 366
manslaughter charge against him as well as the health and safety charges 
against all directors on the basis that the company would plead guilty to 
corporate manslaughter prior to the trial against it commencing.  Indeed, 367
Story took the view that the Crown brought a weak case against the individual 
directors in order to pressurise the company into making such a plea.  368
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The excessive number of charges as well as defendants on the indictment could 
be seen as supporting Story’s view. However, his view is undermined by the 
fact that the company had offered a guilty plea in 2012 but, at that time, the 
Crown had not accepted it on the basis that it also wished to pursue the 
directors individually.  The Crown only accepted the plea after its case 369
against the directors encountered real difficulty at trial.  The fact that the 370
charges against the directors were trialled at all in light of the original plea 
would convey that the Crown felt justified in pursuing them. A further theory 
may be that the Crown were utilising new and relatively untested legislation 
with the 2007 Act. It may have been thought sensible and safer to include other 
tried and tested charges on the indictment as doing so would maximise the 
chances of securing a conviction.  
It could be considered that it would have been interesting to see the result of 
the case against the company had it trialed. Given that the Crown seemed to be 
individually prosecuting two directors mis-identified as responsible and one 
there was merely a weak case against, it could be considered the “senior 
management” test may not have been met.  
Parsons rightly states that all cases prosecuted under the 2007 Act to date:  
…could have been successfully prosecuted for manslaughter under the 
identification doctrine with its ‘controlling officers’ test. The cases, 
therefore, do not illuminate the potential impact of the Act in respect of 
large organisations.   371
He believes that the ‘senior management’ test may be, itself, put to the test in 
relation to large organisations if any charges are brought against the Royal 
Borough of Kensington and ‘Chelsea Council and Kensington and Chelsea 
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Tenant Management Organisation’ for the Grenfell Tower incident.  372
However, Field is not confident that CPS will utilise the Act in light of the fact 
they recently prosecuted the similar case of Southwark Council using fire 
safety regulations instead.  It could be considered that speculations of how 373
the CPS will decide to deal with Grenfell are fairly futile and time will tell. 
3.5 Effectiveness of Penalties 
The aims of penalties are; punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation.  The 374
penalties under the CMCHA 2007 include unlimited fines,  disqualification, 375
publicity orders and remedial orders  the latter of which have never been 376
used.  One view is that fines are not always viewed by deceaseds’ families as 377
satisfactory penalties, however significant.  378
3.5.1 Prison  
Some believe a conviction of corporate homicide/manslaughter should result in 
prison sentences being imposed on individual senior managers.  It has been 379
seen in English cases of corporate manslaughter, however, that prison 
sentences are already one possible outcome for senior managers convicted of 
gross negligence manslaughter and, across England and Scotland, HASWA 
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offences.  It could then be considered that amending the 2007 Act to include 380
prison sentences as a penalty is unnecessary as this can already be achieved by 
the existing law and it has clearly not acted as a deterrent to date as a high 
number of workplace fatalities continue to occur.  381
In terms of the rehabilitative quality of prison, there is no data to show whether 
those imprisoned for gross negligence manslaughter or HASWA convictions go 
on to commit similar offences. It may be presumed from the lack of media 
publicity that they have not. The English cases on corporate manslaughter 
show that around half of those imprisoned served a short sentence of under 12 
months.  General statistics for England and Wales have shown prisoners 382
serving a short sentence of 12 months or less, for all crimes, actually have 
higher re-offending rates than those serving community-based orders  383
showing that short sentences are not the most effective method through which 
to rehabilitate offenders.  
In addition, it could be considered that prison sentences, in themselves, 
sometimes do not offer the deceaseds’ families the catharsis they seek. For 
example, the family of the deceased in R v. Pyranha Mouldings Ltd  had been 384
noted as having expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the case, which, 
included a 9-month prison sentence imposed on a director, however, they were 
dissatisfied with the fact that the company and individuals went to trial instead 
of pleading guilty and admitting their failings.  It could be considered that 385
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restorative justice could be useful in facilitating the families achieving 
closure.  386
3.5.2 Fines, Publicity Orders and Directors’ Disqualification  
As regards the penalties already available under the Act, it is clear some of the 
judiciary are deliberately fining companies either large sums of money or their 
entire assets  to ensure a severe punishment.  387
In R v. Princes Sporting Club,  HHJ McCreath said: 388
I propose to fine the company every penny that it has. I have no greater 
power to do anything other than impose a fine and I cannot impose a 
greater fine than all of its assets.  389
In R v. Mobile Sweepers,  it appears that where this has not been considered 390
sufficient, the Judge has, rightly or wrongly, turned to penalising the director. R 
v. Mobile Sweepers involved an employee being crushed by the sweeper he had 
been instructed to repair and it had been found that the sweeper lacked any 
functioning prop to elevate it. The company pled guilty to corporate 
manslaughter, was fined £8,000 and ordered to pay costs of £4000, which, 
represented its entire assets.  The sole director pled guilty to a HASWA 1974 391
s 2 offence and was fined £183,000, a Publicity Order was granted and this was 
also the first case where the director was disqualified for five years.   392
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HHJ Boney said it was, “one of the most serious offences of its kind that these 
courts are ever likely to encounter.” but it was commented in the media at the 
time that the fine imposed on the company was, “the lowest fine for corporate 
manslaughter to date”  obviously due to being restricted to the value of the 393
company’s limited assets. It is notable that this was the first case where the 
Judge was willing to impose a large fine on the director personally. Indeed, the 
alternative for the director was to face three years imprisonment.  394
It could be considered that where a company has been put out of business 
through a fine, there is no hope of rehabilitation for the company. Fines 
carrying a death sentence for the company are considered by one commentator 
to be “more appropriate” than lower ones as these conveyed that, “deterrence 
and the public condemnation of the company’s behaviour were the primary 
considerations”.   395
One view is that the imposition of a fine on the company also inadvertently 
punishes the directors as their reputations may be tarnished by association.  396
This view is mirrored in relation to publicity orders and it was stated: 
The possibility of a publicity order is clearly designed to act as another 
deterrent to lax health and safety practices. A publicity order may 
potentially be more damaging than a fine as it has reputational 
implications and it has been articulated that it could also affect share 
prices and lead to higher insurance premiums.  397
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It could also be considered, however, that the media attention such cases 
receive renders these orders unnecessary. As regards director disqualification, 
there is no data to show whether this meets any of the aims of punishment. It 
could be presumed a severe penalty as it is removing the directors’ livelihoods. 
One observation is that one of the disqualified directors in the English 
corporate manslaughter cases went on to subsequently become a director of 
another company after the period of disqualification expired.  It, therefore, 398
appears to be a role he would have wished to continue had it not been for the 
disqualification. It could be considered that fines, whether on the company or 
directors, and disqualification may have a deterrent and rehabilitative impact 
on the individuals to the extent that, presumably, they would be less likely to 
make the same mistakes in future should they go on to direct other companies. 
3.5.3 Sentencing Generally  
The disparate approach by the judiciary in sentencing is seen most clearly 
when the first and second cases of corporate manslaughter to arise, R v. 
Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd  and R v. Lion Steel Equipment 399
Limited  are compared.  400
In the appeal for Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd, Lord Judge C.J. noted 
the following factors. The sentencing judge had had regard to the Sentencing 
Council’s Definitive Guidelines, which, explained the factors determining the 
seriousness of the offence. The first was whether serious injury was 
foreseeable  and it was deemed to be “plainly foreseeable”.  401 402
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The Lord Judge C.J. said: 
Having reflected on the seriousness of the offence, the judge turned to the 
financial position of the company. He acknowledged that it was parlous. 
It had been kept going by Mr Eaton. It was just about breaking even. 
Given his illness, it did not have a very bright future. The judge also 
recognised that a substantial fine would inevitably put the company into 
liquidation and therefore its employees out of work. He recognised, too, 
that all this would have an impact on Mr Eaton's family at a time when 
they would have troubles enough. He accepted the genuineness of Mr 
Eaton's expressions of deep remorse and regret. Finally, he had in mind 
the moving victim impact statement provided by the mother of the 
deceased.  403
The judge had then considered the guideline’s suggestions on the general level 
of fines and noted that the company was a small-scale operation as reflected in 
its turnover and financial state. He acknowledged that a fine of £385,000 - 
250% of the company’s turnover - would inevitably liquidate the company but 
it, “would be sufficient to mark the gravity of the offence and to send the 
necessary message about the need for employers generally to attend to their 
duties to provide safe places of work.”  404
Despite provisions in the Guidelines and legislation stating that the level of fine 
should be one the company is capable of paying,  it was held the level of fine 405
correctly reflected the seriousness of the offence.  Indeed, Lord Judge C.J. 406
said the Guidelines state the court should have regard to the question of, 
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“whether the fine will have the effect of putting the defendant out of 
business…in some bad cases this may be an acceptable consequence.”  407
In R v. Lion Steel,  Mr Berry, a maintenance man  in one of Lion’s Steel’s 408 409
factories who usually carried out small repairs  had attempted to fix a leak on 410
the roof. He stepped on to a skylight, which, became detached under his weight 
and he fell 13 meters to the floor, sustaining fatal injuries.  The company pled 411
guilty to corporate homicide.  It was fined £480,000  and ordered to pay 412 413
costs of £84,000.  414
In this case, as regards the sentence passed, in assessing the seriousness of 
harm, the risk of injury or death was foreseeable. The company had not done 
enough to deal with obvious risks such as installing inexpensive safety 
measures and attention to safety was lax compared to its sister site. There were 
no aggravating factors identified  but mitigating factors included the 415
company’s reasonable health and safety record, the fact it had stopped using its 
own men to conduct roof repairs and its willingness to accept health and safety 
advice from various sources.  It was also noted that there had been an 416
unreasonable delay between the deceased’s death and the Crown bringing 
charges.   417
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It could be considered that a common theme between Cotswold  and Lion 418
Steel  may be the potential aspect of a break in the chain of causation due to 419
the deceaseds failing to heed the employers’ instructions and breaching their 
systems of work.  However, due to Lion Steel  being unreported, it cannot 420 421
be established with certainty whether or not this was so. 
In Lion Steel, the deceased had been advised to instruct independent outside 
contractors to attend if he was in any doubt as to his ability to carry out a 
task.  However, the Judge said, that Mr Berry was devoid of blame for the 422
incident and “met his death when he took just the sort of chance which the 
advice and regulations are designed to protect against.”  It could be 423
considered that this seems rather self-contradictory as it appears that there is 
some recognition by the Judge that the deceased should have been aware of the 
risks involved but carried on regardless. 
The financial position of the company was then considered and it seems that 
there was an obvious and unfair disparity between how this company and 
Cotswold were treated. In this case, at the time of the incident, the company 
had six directors,  142 employees  and a turnover of £10 million per 424 425
annum.  Unlike Cotswold, the company was, “holding its own financially”,  426 427
however, the Judge said “If a substantial fine were imposed with a short 
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payment period, it would have a potentially severe impact on the company’s 
ability to sustain itself in business.”  He said: 428
I am very mindful of the 142 people who work at Lion Steel. I would 
regard it as a most regrettable consequence, which would add to the 
terrible consequences of Mr Berry’s death, if the effect of an order of this 
court were to imperil the employment of his former colleagues and those 
who would have been had he lived.  429
Balanced against the need for “significant punishment” to attach to the offence, 
the Judge felt an extended payment period would allow the company to raise a 
loan.  The judge further considered the companies earlier guilty plea and,  430 431
given these factors, the fine was discounted by 20%.  432
It can be seen from this that there is a disparity in the Judges’ treatment of 
Cotswold and Lion Steel. It seems unfair that Lion Steel, a much larger and 
more prosperous company than Cotswold, was given a fine it could afford to 
pay whilst Cotswold was given a fine that would force it to liquidate. Whilst 
there were some factors that may have justified Lion Steel receiving an 
affordable fine, the disparity in the attitude taken towards the employees losing 
their jobs is surprising. The jobs of those in Cotswold, although fewer in 
number, were no less significant. It is questionable whether the number of 
people who work for a company should have any bearing on the decision. It 
potentially raises an ECHR Article 14 argument if smaller companies are being 
discriminated against. 
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In Cotswold, the judge clearly considered the circumstances surrounding the 
death to constitute a “bad case” under the Sentencing Guidelines  justifying 433
the companies liquidation and employees being put out of work. The judge in 
Lion Steel seemed to be eager to avoid this, stating he was, “very mindful of 
the 142 people who work at Lion Steel.”  It could be submitted that the 434
circumstances surrounding the death in Lion Steel, although different, were no 
less “bad”.  
Looking at the corporate manslaughter cases in the round, it could be 
considered that two drawbacks to sentencing is its, “…unjustifiable 
inconsistency"  and, in some cases, the lack of practical impact of the fines 435
and publicity orders on the offenders. As regards the former, it is clear that in 
some cases, a company may be fined in such a way so as to put it out of 
business whilst in some cases it is fined in such a way so as to allow it to 
continue. In some cases, a publicity order is granted whilst in some, it is not. In 
some cases, directors are disqualified whilst in some they are not. There seems 
to be no particular justification for these disparities.   436
As regards the imposition of fines, imposing fines the companies cannot pay 
forces them to liquidate and, as such, it is unlikely the fine will ever be paid.  437
Where a publicity order is also imposed upon a company in this position, 
again, this will have no practical impact as the company has ceased trading. It 
was commented such sentences have, “little more than symbolic value”,  438
however, they serve to warn other companies that safety must be prioritised.  439
It could be considered that the message of deterrence may be clearer if 
sentencing was more consistent.  
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3.6 Conclusion  
Across the UK, barriers to prosecutions have historically included the 
identification doctrine, a lack of aggregation, Crown immunity and, in 
Scotland, the need to show the actus reus and mens rea. The CMCHA 2007 has 
corrected all of these issues and, although there have been no prosecutions 
under the Act in Scotland, there have been several in England which have met 
with guilty pleas and verdicts. 
It has been noted one main concern with the CMCHA 2007 is the ‘senior 
management’ test and its perceived restrictiveness. However, case law shows 
this perception has no basis in reality and several individuals below ‘senior 
managers’ in the company hierarchy are being charged under the Act.      
Case law also shows that the same types of reasons for finding companies 
guilty of corporate manslaughter have arisen, however, it is clear there are 
disparities in sentencing. In terms of ensuring the aims of penalties are met, it 
could be considered a clearer and more consistent approach should be 
employed by the judiciary. Overall, the CMCHA 2007 appears effective which 
indicates a lack of need for reform. It will now be considered how criminal 
responsibility should theoretically be attributed to companies. 
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Chapter 4: Attributing Responsibility  
4.0 Introduction  
This chapter considers how criminal responsibility should be attributed for the 
crime of corporate homicide/manslaughter. In particular, the first section 
examines two different theories of criminal responsibility and its function. With 
reference to these theories, the second section examines when a company 
should be held criminally liable for an employee’s death. The third section 
considers whether  companies’ liability for corporate homicide/manslaughter 
should fall under civil or criminal law. The fourth section then considers how 
the mens rea of corporate homicide/manslaughter should be defined. 
4.1. Criminal Responsibility 
4.1.1. Criminal Responsibility as a Mechanism for Enforcing Norms 
For Loughnan the “most dominant account” of responsibility sees it as the 
“normative heart of the criminal law”.  She states:  440
…this idea connects legal responsibility and moral responsibility, legal 
wrongs and moral wrongs, and legal blaming practices and moral 
blaming practices, with criminal law understood as a system of official 
censure and sanction or punishment for certain types of conduct. …On 441
this account, the structure of moral wrongdoing – requiring both harm 
and fault – is carried over to the criminal law.  Indeed, on this view, 442
criminal responsibility is derivative of moral practices of calling 
individuals to account for their conduct. Thus, on this basis, the 
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application of the ordinary principles of liability and punishment – the 
standard criminal law practices of evaluation, attribution and blame – is 
taken to be an acknowledgement or affirmation of an individual’s 
(‘normal’) status as a moral subject. …criminal responsibility is taken 443
to assume a relation with individuals which seeks to maximise their 
freedom from interference by the state, and in which the individual 
experiences himself or herself as free. As a result, criminal responsibility 
operates as a limit on the criminal law and the power of the state: it 
creates a space beyond which criminal law is inappropriate or 
illegitimate, on the basis that it exceeds the boundaries of a liberal legal 
system and impermissibly impinges on the sovereign self.  444
It seems paradoxical, however, that individuals need to be subjected to norms 
in order to have maximum freedom. It may be that individuals really just have 
the maximum freedom that the state allows. It has been said that norms impose 
duties on individuals, however, both the norm and the duty are products of 
normative cognition.  There is no scientific test to confirm the validity of 445
norms, whether these be legal norms or other types, and their validity is only 
pre-supposed.  In essence, the concept of norms can be critiqued for simply  446
describing a duty that “ought to be” instead of explaining why it exists.   447
It could be considered that theories have sought to fill in the blanks such as 
Durkheim’s theory on the division of labour which provides that, law 
reinforces societal norms and conversely, in the absence of law, societal norms 
break down and crime occurs.  The concept that obeying the law is a societal 448
norm also lends itself to the idea that criminal law is instrumental in “othering” 
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criminals. In other words, criminals are branded as something “other” than 
mainstream society by virtue of the fact they have not complied with this 
norm.   449
Labelling theorists would probably suggest that society’s detection of the norm 
violation is of more significance than the violation itself as one is labelled a 
‘criminal’ when processed through the criminal justice system. It has been 
suggested that, “…the person does not become criminal by violating the law 
but by being labelled a violator of the law.”  One issue with this is that the 450
acceptance and internalisation of the label ‘criminal’ may lead individuals to 
commit further crimes as the stigma of a conviction may impact negatively on 
employment opportunities  and social capital.  451 452
The theory of criminal responsibility as a mechanism for enforcing norms 
centralises the rational actor and submits that, as the actor can choose to carry 
out the actus reus and form the men rea for crime,  he should be held 453
accountable via the criminal justice system if he does so.  One observation of 454
this theory is that framing the mens rea in this way renders it a constraint on 
state power as, even if an actor carries out the actus reus, his act may not be 
considered criminal if he lacks the mens rea.  An alternative view of criminal 455
responsibility is as an institution.  
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4.1.2. Criminal Responsibility as an Institution  
Farmer understands responsibility from an institutional perspective, which, 
sees government devising more forms of responsibility through enacting laws 
and, therefore, widening the scope of criminality.  He moves away from ideas 456
of the mens rea acting as a constraint on state power and towards something 
that shapes the substantive content of law. Therefore, responsibility is linked to 
pre-existing expectations about the scope of our duties in relation to others.  457
Responsibility has, through history to modern day, become central to law’s 
form and is a way of securing civil order and this provides a different 
perspective on criminalisation. In particular, it allows for discussions on how 
individuals are subject to the law, “responsibility as liability”  and how 458
responsibility shapes understandings of the criminal law’s scope and 
structure.  459
Law, as a normative order, designates legal ‘persons’  who, are considered 460
rational actors and, thus, both capable to being subject to the law and of the 
law.  Those deemed to be ‘persons’ are subject to law as a normative order 461
and are institutionalised to provide a link between legal personality and 
responsibility.  Ideas of ‘persons’ are shaped by cultural and political ideas 462
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Personhood may be active in as much as the person can be guided by law or 
passive in as much as the law protects persons’ interests.  Farmer states, 464
“Capacities depend on features of the person that are treated as legally relevant 
at any given point in time or for particular purposes” and this may include 
natural features such as usage, sex or institutional status such as citizenship or 
role,  the latter of which is relevant for our purposes as those in senior 465
manager roles are synonymous with the company. 
Farmer states active personality applies to those capable of, “making their 
actions conform to or violate norms of conduct” and those who can conform to 
norms can equally be held accountable for breaching them.  Further 466
implications of being a responsible agent involve that responsibility should 
only be attributed to those who are recognised as having the capacity to 
understand and follow the rules.   467
4.2 When Should a Company be Held Responsible for Corporate Homicide/
Manslaughter? 
The CMCHA 2007 holds a company, as a legal personality, responsible for 
corporate homicide/manslaughter resulting from the actus reus and mens rea of 
its senior managers.  This is in keeping with the concept of corporate liability 468
as the acts of senior managers are deemed to be the acts of the company. This 
also acknowledges that individual senior managers may not have been involved 
in the fatality in a direct sense so they are not held individually responsible. 
This section focuses on establishing when a company should be held 
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The author, Weigend, seems to endorse the dominant view of responsibility. He 
states: 
In a rational system, it makes no sense to blame and punish a person for 
harmful occurrences that he has no possibility to prevent or that she was 
unable to foresee. It is therefore a universal principle that attribution of a 
harmful event to a person in criminal law requires not only a causal link 
between the person’s conduct and the event but also a mental link 
between the person and the occurrence.   469
In the context of corporate homicide/manslaughter under the 2007 Act, it 
would not be the senior managers but the company who would be blamed and 
punished. The attribution of the harmful event - the victim’s death - to the 
company requires causal links between the senior managers’ conduct and 
mental states and the death. However, following Weigend, the company should 
not be held criminally responsible and punished if senior managers did not 
know or could not have known their actions would result in death.  In 470
criminal law generally, criminal liability requires the actus reus along with 
intention or negligence.  471
It seems more careful judicial consideration of cases under the 2007 Act would 
avoid potential unfairness to companies. In particular, more careful 
consideration of whether a senior manager actually did organise or manage 
activities that led to the employee’s death or did actually possess the mens rea 
of negligence needs to take place. It appears from cases such as R v. Lion 
Steel,  that this careful consideration does not always take place. Indeed, in 472
that case, it was difficult to detect any blameworthiness or negligence by most 
of the managers. 
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Weigend states, “…it is not enough to show that an average person could have 
avoided the harmful result, but must be proved that the individual defendant 
could have done so. In other words, due diligence is what is required of “this” 
person.”  He provides that an individual’s defects, which may serve as an 473
excuse, should be considered and he provides the example, “a severely short-
sighted driver cannot in fairness be expected to see an obstacle from afar. 
However, a diligent person with individual defects must avoid situations that 
are potentially risky, given his defects. For example, a motorist afflicted with 
night-blindness must refrain from driving his car at night; if he drives at night it 
is foreseeable for him that he might harm others; for him, driving at night is 
therefore per se negligent conduct.”  474
This raises the question of whether a person’s position in an organisational 
hierarchy, which in practice could be expected to link in with their level of 
knowledge or risks, could or should be considered to be a type of ‘defect’ 
serving to excuse the company. Specifically, we see from case law that people 
below senior managers in the company hierarchy are, in practice, being treated 
as senior managers for the purposes of the Crown prosecuting companies under 
the 2007 Act. Aside from deviating from the black letter of the law, it could be 
considered that these individuals may lack the same level of foresight as 
someone who is, in reality, a senior manager and, as such, they have an excuse. 
Similar questions arise in relation to senior managers who are, in reality, senior 
managers but may be new to the role or lack experience. It may be considered 
that someone new or inexperienced may also possess such a ‘defect’ serving to 
excuse the company. Therefore, the 2007 Act’s capacity to hold such 
individuals as synonymous with the company may cause unfairness. 
Given Farmer’s notions of personhood, this also poses issues as, in some cases, 
companies have been held responsible for incidents senior managers could not 
have had any conception of. As senior managers have had no conception of 
them, it could be considered that notions of active personality cannot apply and 
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senior managers did not have any chance to follow the rules. As this was the 
case, their companies should not be held accountable. It may be a different 
matter if a death was caused in instances where senior managers had been fully 
aware of health and safety issues in the workplace and turned a blind eye to 
them. In such an instance, it could be considered that responsibility should 
attach to the companies.   
To be considered a legal ‘person’, it is assumed one has an “understanding of 
intentionality, or the capacity to plan action over time.”  However, in reality, 475
senior managers may not appreciate the cumulative consequences of their 
predecessors' actions or the fatal result for an employee. It would be 
fundamentally wrong to assume than any employer would “plan” the death an 
employee. If they did, it would probably be treated as murder rather than 
corporate homicide/manslaughter. Some of the case law illustrates that the 
death appears to be the result of an unfortunate conflation of events rather than 
a result that could in any way have been shown to be intended by a manager. 
The legal person should be able to identify with others thus control his 
behaviour and this, in turn, means that he is responsible. As he is responsible, 
he is subject to legal norms and, as he is subject to legal norms, he 
consequently justifies punishment as a consequence of breaching them.   476
Farmer states: 
If we understand responsibility in this way, then we see criminal 
responsibility in particular as rooted in the practices of defining the scope 
of responsibilities and of holding to account by particular legal 
institutions …The link between personhood and responsibility has 477
primarily been recognized in relation to what has been called ‘outcome’ 
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or ‘historic’ or retrospective responsibility, that is to say that we 
responsible to others for our past conduct…  478
Given this, it would seem acceptable that a company can be held responsible 
for the acts of its current and past senior managers and this concept is in line 
with aggregation. 
4.3 Should Criminal or Civil Liability Attach to Corporate Homicide/
Manslaughter?   
Farmer states that notions of active responsibility includes both: 
…‘prospective’ responsibility - the imposition of obligations and duties 
on a person who is deemed capable of adapting their conduct to norms 
and planning their conduct over time - and that of respective liability - 
being held responsible for past conduct (answerability and 
accountability).  Indeed, the latter to a great extent depends on the 479
former: a person cannot be answerable to others unless there is a form of 
prospective responsibility in the sense of the existence of recognised 
norms of conduct. These obligations may range from the general (do not 
kill, respect the person and property of others), to more specific duties, 
such as those which go along with understandings of…particular social 
roles … An account of criminal responsibility may be therefore just as 480
much concerned with the specification of roles and responsibilities in 
modern society as with the attribution of ‘retrospective responsibility’.  481
It thus follows that what has to be justified is not only the imposition of 
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punishment but the distribution of social responsibilities, explicitly 
linking responsibility and criminalization.  482
Following this, it could be considered that the existence of corporate homicide/
manslaughter laws have given senior managers the chance to adapt and plan 
their conduct over time, making the company answerable for the prospective 
and past conduct of its senior managers. However, it should be carefully 
considered whether senior managers have been able to plan their conduct in 
such a way so as to avoid the fatality, especially if it is a consequence of a 
culmination of events over a lengthy period. It appears a company should only 
be criminal liable in the event that senior manager could foresee risks to the 
employee and allowed the employee to continue to operate in that environment 
in any event. 
Farmer states:  
It has been argued that specification of responsibilities is beyond the 
scope of the criminal law - the civil law is concerned with the 
identification of rights and duties and the criminal law merely with 
specifying the principle of liability for those breaches.  However, 483
criminal law as a matter of fact routinely articulates responsibilities and 
duties, either explicitly or implicitly, even in areas where the established 
regime of rights is civil law. The failure to recognize this link in theories 
of criminalisation leads to a significantly narrower view of the relevance 
of responsibility.  484
Depending on individual perception, the duty of care provisions in the 2007 
Act could fall within either of these two views - either the civil law is 
continuing to identify the responsibilities and the criminal statute merely 
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provides the sanction for breaching them or, by virtue of the duty existing 
within a criminal statute, the criminal law has taken ownership of articulating 
the duties.  
Farmer further states that there are ideas that: 
Criminal law deals with responsibility for acts and tort law for outcomes, 
or that criminal law should be concerned with more serious forms of fault 
and wrong-doing, or those wrongs deserving of punishment. The 
distinction is not really so clear-cut (there are different standards of fault 
in both crime and tort, and attempts to distinguish between crime and tort 
are hard to sustain).   485
The 2007 Act appears to be an example of where the distinction is not clear-cut 
and the duty of care provisions in the Act only add to the confusion. Indeed, if 
it was thought distinct roles for criminal and civil law should exist, it could be 
considered that the 2007 Act blurs the distinction between and interchanges the 
roles of criminal and civil law by providing criminal outcomes for companies 
whose managers breach civil law responsibilities. It would be more 
straightforward and less confusing to have civil provisions within a civil 
statute. Recently proposed reforms seek to perpetuate this issue by retaining the 
duty of care provisions.  486
However, the HASWA 1974 ss. 2–7 could also be considered to provide a 
further example of the law providing criminal outcomes for breaches of civil 
law responsibilities so the 2007 Act is in keeping with this. Unlike the 2007 
Act, the HASWA 1974 provides prison sentences, generally considered to be a 
criminal sanction, can attach to individuals. 
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It may be thought that, as the 2007 Act states that fatalities in the workplace are 
committed through negligence rather than intention, criminal sanctions should 
not attach and this is a view in line with the aims of punishment.  
On that topic, Weigend states: 
With regard to preventative purposes of the criminal law, one might say 
that intentional conduct lends itself to being deterred more than mere 
inadvertence, and a person showing anti-legal tendencies may be in 
greater need of reform than someone who just does not pay attention. 
Because the law plausibly reserves the most severe punishment for 
intentional conduct, the issue of distinguishing between intentional and 
non-intentional conduct is of great legal relevance.  487
Following this, it seems that more severe penalties, such as prison, should be 
imposed upon intentional rather than negligent conduct. Given this, it would 
seem the current legislation’s provision of a fine on the company rather than 
the proposed reform of prison sentences on individual managers would be 
preferable. 
The mens rea for crimes are often inferred and so policy reasons for imposing 
harsher penalties upon intentional offending are important.  These include 488
that an intentional offender has consciously broken  or ignored the law,  he 489 490
should have been able to refrain from criminality due to his knowledge of the 
all relevant facts,  and his intentional offending contributes to public 491
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insecurity about social order therefore harsher sanctions helps to restore public 
faith in the justice system.   492
Weigend states: 
It is a matter of policy (and not of great practical consequence) whether 
the criminal law exempts instances of slight negligence from its reach 
and limits responsibility to gross negligence. Doing so creates a margin 
of appreciation for prosecutors and courts, but if serious harm has been 
caused by a person courts are likely, for psychological reasons, to find 
that he behaved in a grossly negligent manner (if that is the legal 
requirement for liability). Liability for negligence is, after all, greatly 
result-oriented—its role is to satisfy the victim’s and society’s need to 
hold someone responsible when disaster strikes. It is for that reason that 
individual responsibility in practice plays a very minor role in 
determining negligence.  493
Despite what Weigend states, there are great practical consequences for those 
involved in a case. In particular, it could be considered that the “margin of 
appreciation” referred to may have allowed proceedings to be brought against 
some of the aforementioned companies more due to the serious harm that befell 
the deceased rather than due to any fault of the senior managers. It seems 
unfair that, “society’s need to hold someone responsible when disaster strikes” 
should mean such companies being caught under the 2007 Act or any proposed 
reform.    
An alternative approach to health and safety offences can be seen in the US 
Model Penal Code where such offences are considered non-imprisonable 
“violations”.  It seems that this is more proportionate and the 2007 Act is in 494
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keeping with that. In Scotland, recent proposed reform suggested that the law 
may be going in the opposite direction with a focus on tougher criminal 
sanctions in line with political perceptions about the public’s wishes.  495
On balance, it is difficult to say whether liability should be civil or criminal. 
However, it seems the most severe sanctions should attach to intentional crimes 
rather than ones committed through negligence. Therefore, the 2007 Act’s 
provision of a fine which attaches to the company rather than individuals seems 
the most acceptable solution. 
4.4 What Should the Mens Rea of Corporate Homicide/Manslaughter be?   
Mens rea is used to distinguish intentional from negligent homicides as the act 
involved in both, namely, causing the death of another, is the same. Therefore, 
according to Weigend, “mens rea does not characterise blameworthiness as 
such but wrongful conduct.”  It could be considered, however, that concepts 496
of blameworthiness and wrongful conduct are inseparable: the more wrongful 
the conduct, the more the actor is to blame.   
Weigend firstly sets out knowledge and will as ‘elements of intention’,  497
suggesting that both comprise the concept of intention. However, he then goes 
on to describe knowledge and will in the next section of his article as ‘modes 
of intention’, suggesting that each can form a different type of intention.  498
Initially, this seems confusing, however, he later explains that different ‘modes’ 
of intention are formed depending on the different levels of the accused’s 
knowledge and will at the time of the offence.  It could be considered that 499
this explanation would have been more helpful earlier in his article. An 
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aforementioned point could be re-raised here in that will is associated with 
motive, which, should be distinguished from mens rea.   500
However, Weigend justifies his view by stating that:  
…intentional fault is of greater gravity than non-intentional (negligent) 
fault. Yet, a person can do just as much harm as someone who commits 
an intentional offence, and a negligent person likewise fails in his 
obligation to take other persons’ legitimate interests into account when he 
acts.  501
It could be considered a matter of individual perception whether one would 
consider the negligent fault of senior managers, under the 2007 Act, to be of 
lesser gravity than intentional fault. It is true that they have done just as much 
harm in terms of the outcome of the destruction of life. However, it is arguable 
if they have failed to take into account the deceased’s legitimate interests in the 
same manner as an intentional actor. In intentional killings, there is typically a 
directness and personal one-to-one dynamic between the parties that is lacking 
in this instance. As we have seen from the case law, some of the fatalities 
involve circumstances where the senior manager was not even present and 
could not realistically have foreseen, never mind tried to prevent, the death 
occurring.     
Intentional fault involves the accused acting with a hostile attitude towards the 
victim’s protected interest whereas negligence does not.  However, it could 502
be considered that if intention were reverted to as the mode of fault in Scots 
law, it would go without saying that the problems inherent in Transco  would 503
re-arise and there would be a disparity again between Scottish and English law.  
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Weigend submits that someone who intentionally kills possesses both the 
knowledge and will that their actions will cause death.  He further submits 504
that where harm is caused in cases where the accused had little or no will to 
cause it but a knowledge and awareness of the risks involved he will still be 
held liable. However, he does not go on to say exactly what that level of 
liability is or should be,  which, is unhelpful. It could be supposed that he is 505
referring to recklessness. In the context of homicide, this is a strand of the mens 
rea for murder and so subject to the same critiques about its inappropriateness 
in a corporate homicide/manslaughter context as intention.  
In respect of recklessness, this is described as a, “conscious disregard of a 
substantial risk” where the accused knows his behaviour is likely to cause 
serious harm but he carries on regardless. Other issues with recklessness 
include that the concept of a, “substantial risk” is not always easy to 
articulate.  It can cover a spectrum of situations and can depend on the 506
accused’s purpose and the level of harm that befalls the victim.   507
In English law, the notion of reckless manslaughter is controversial.  Some 508
feel the other forms of involuntary manslaughter are better established and 
there is some unwillingness to acknowledge reckless manslaughter as a distinct 
crime.  Few prosecutors rely on reckless manslaughter as it is easier to argue 509
their case based on unlawful act or gross negligence manslaughter.  The 510
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broad scope of these heads has minimised the need for recklessness.  511
However, some contend that reckless manslaughter as a distinct crime is 
needed to secure convictions in cases unlawful act and gross negligence 
manslaughter cannot cover  and it should capture those "who currently fall 512
just short of … murder”.  It could be considered that this is similar to the 513
residual role of the Scottish concept of culpable homicide.   514
Negligence occurs where the accused has recognised the risks but acts 
regardless. Weigend states he acts with an unfounded sense of “optimism” that, 
despite the risks, no harm will occur and this should be irrelevant for the 
purposes of determining whether an offence is intentional or negligent.  515
Weigend states that as negligence has no mens rea, “in the proper sense”, some 
have suggested offences carried out negligently should not come under the 
gambit of criminal law.  However, he states, “But legislatures nevertheless 516
tend to provide for criminal liability for inadvertent negligence in a variety of 
areas, typically relating to serious harm (negligent killing and wounding) but 
also to business misconduct.”  It could be considered that the 2007 Act 517
provides a prime example of this.  
He also states that negligence: 
…is characterized by a self-contradictory state in the offender’s mind: 
she knows that a serious risk exists but does not take it seriously; instead 
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she “trusts” that nothing bad will result from her conduct. If this situation 
exists, it implies that a perpetrator is intellectually aware of the risk that 
an offense will be committed; it is thus appropriate to characterize this 
kind of “conscious negligence” as a type of mens rea. …The situation is 
fundamentally different where a risk exists but the actor is unaware of 
it…the law cannot reproach an actor for having a “guilty mind”, because 
he is not even aware of the possibility that his conduct might be harmful 
to another person.   518
This could describe some corporate homicide/manslaughter cases particularly 
where acts constituting the offence have occurred over a long time. It may be 
that a specific senior manager could not have foreseen that his acts, combined 
with that of others, would have resulted in the culminated risk.   
In cases of death caused by negligence, it suffices that an accused lacked will 
but had knowledge that the circumstances could have led to a death.  519
Weigend gives the examples of, “assault causing death” or “robbery causing 
death”.  He states that, in such cases, it is sufficient only to show the accused 520
intended the principle act i.e., the assault or robbery, and he will then be held 
responsible for any naturally flowing consequence of the act such as the death 
on the basis that he was negligent as he could have foreseen it.  The author 521
states that in common law jurisdictions a defendant in the same circumstances 
would probably be found guilty of murder regardless of whether he did or 
could have foreseen the death.   522
It could be considered that the first alternative would be fairer to the accused. 
However, neither of these alternatives reflect what happens in a corporate 
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homicide/manslaughter situation. In such circumstances, the senior managers 
are not actively or directly harming the deceased and the death occurs in a 
more remote and impersonal manner. 
In addition to the consideration of the different mens rea, a further option is 
strict liability, which, only requires the actus reus to be proved and the notion 
dispenses with mens rea entirely. Strict liability offences exist to cover 
instances where the actor’s behaviour creates grave risks and it may be hard to 
prove mens rea. Weigend states that, “The idea of dispensing with proof of 
intention or negligence is to increase the pressure to conform to safety rules on 
the part of those who act in the areas.”   523
It could be considered that Weigend’s words could describe the 2007 Act and 
proposed reform in both its purpose and its ability to potentially dispense with 
notions of individual mens rea. The 2007 Act and proposed reform both allow 
for aggregation and, respectively, convictions for companies and individual 
managers. However, in relation to the proposed reform, this may result in 
individual senior managers, in practice, being held strictly liable for 
negligence. This is a very strange idea as the concepts of strict liability and 
negligence should not co-exist in a single offence, it should be one or the other. 
Under the proposed reform, the fact that a prison sentence can also be imposed 
means that the senior managers may be dealt with overly harshly. 
4.5 Conclusion 
As regards how responsibility should be attributed, Weigend’s theory 
centralises the rational actor  whilst Farmer’s centralises responsibility as an 524
institution in the legal system.  Both theories seem to convey that criminal 525
liability should attach where senior managers foresaw the risks but continued 
to act regardless. Overall, it is difficult to determine whether liability for 
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corporate homicide/manslaughter should be criminal or civil. However, 
negligence appears to be the most suitable mens rea. It seems the most fitting 
manner of dealing with cases of corporate homicide/manslaughter would be to 
hold companies liable for the negligence of the senior manager if, in fact, “she 
knows that a serious risk exists but does not take it seriously; instead she 
“trusts” that nothing bad will result from her conduct.”  However, as “it 526
makes no sense to blame and punish a person for harmful occurrences that he 
has no possibility to prevent or that she was unable to foresee.”,  the 527
circumstances of the case should be more carefully assessed than they have 
previously sometimes been. If it cannot be shown that senior managers could 
not have avoided or foreseen the risk, then it would follow that their companies 
should not be held liable and punished under criminal law. Following Weigend, 
it seems the most severe penalties should attach to intentional rather than 
negligent offending.  Therefore, the current penalty under the CMCHA 2007 528
of a fine on the company seems more fitting than the penalty of prison 
sentences for individual senior managers under recently proposed reform. 
Given this and that the most suitable mens rea for the offence is negligence, as 
we currently have under the 2007 Act, there appears to be a lack of need for 
reform. 




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This work aimed to answer the question of whether the law on corporate 
homicide should be reformed.  
The current Scottish legal framework on homicide encompasses murder, 
culpable homicide, causing death by driving and corporate homicide. The laws 
of murder, culpable homicide and causing death by driving do not adequately 
address instances of deaths arising in the workplace. The crime of corporate 
homicide in Scotland, or corporate manslaughter in England, is currently 
regulated by the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. It 
is shown by senior managers, or in practice, sometimes those under the level of 
senior managers in the company hierarchy, acting negligently in relation to 
workplace health and safety practices to such a degree that a death results.  In 529
breaching their duty of care towards the deceased, the company itself rather 
than the senior mangers is held liable.  530
In relation to legal development, English law showed how the Scots law should 
be changed. Prior to the CMCHA 2007, in Scotland, Transco  set out the law 531
in relation to culpable homicide in a commercial context. An appeal that arose 
in England in the same year as Transco,  R v. Mark,  exemplified how the 532 533
law in England operated in relation to the similar offence gross negligence 
manslaughter, a type of involuntary manslaughter. Transco  provided 534
alternative charges of culpable homicide and HASWA 1974 whereas, in R v. 
Mark, guilty pleas to HASWA 1974 breaches seemed to facilitate the company 
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also being found guilty of gross negligence manslaughter.  However, one 535
problem in the English law was trying to define gross negligence manslaughter 
and the use of recklessness only seemed to confuse the issue more.  536
In Transco, it was held that a company could commit culpable homicide if the 
actus reus and mens rea for the offence could be shown.  Using the 537
identification doctrine, the elements of culpable homicide had to be shown to 
rest in the “directing mind and will” of the company, in essence, the 
directors.  Like the position in England, the elements of the offence could not 538
be aggregated between individuals.  Unlike the position in England where 539
negligence is the mens rea in gross negligence manslaughter,  its use in 540
Transco was explicitly rejected.  541
The Law Commission of England and Wales felt there were several drivers for 
reform including a perception that prosecution rates were unsatisfactory against 
a backdrop of high numbers of industrial incidents. It was recognised that 
senior managers, rather than employees at ground level were to blame, 
however, it was also recognised that senior managers should not be held 
responsible merely for being in charge at the time when disaster strikes.  It 542
could be considered, looking at some of the post-reform case law, this was not 
wholly achieved. A separate consideration was that the Crown should not be 
 R v. Alan James Mark Nationwide Heating Services Ltd (n 12) [18] (Lord Justice Scott Baker) 535
citing [4A]-[10C] Bean J. [18] (Lord Justice Scott Baker) citing [4A]-[10C] Bean J.  
 Law Commission (n 209)536
 Transco Plc. (n 11) [14] (Lord Osborne) citing R v. Coroner (HM) for East Kent, ex Spooner 537
and Others (1989) 88 Cr App R 10 [16] (Bingham LJ) 
 ibid [23] (Lord Osborne)538
 R v. Alan James Mark Nationwide Heating Services Ltd (n 12) [19] (Lord Justice Baker Scott); 539
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immune from prosecution for instances of corporate homicide/manslaughter,  543
which, could be considered fair.  
Following the introduction of the CMCHA 2007, there have been no successful 
prosecutions in Scotland and cases that appear suitable for prosecution seem to 
be being dealt with under the HASWA 1974 instead.  It is unclear why this is 544
happening, especially as the 22 successfully prosecuted English cases  show 545
that the 2007 Act is effective. There is however, a disparate approach in 
England to decision making as illustrated in the case law. The success of the 
2007 Act is further illustrated by the fact that most companies pled guilty to 
corporate manslaughter although these pleas resulted in other regulatory 
charges against the individual directors being dropped. Three cases under the 
Act have resulted in acquittal,  but, looking at the circumstances, these 546
decisions appear to be understandable.  
A main concern about the CMCHA 2007 is the lack of prosecutions brought 
under it,  however, it could be considered that, without knowing the Crown’s 547
reasons for this, it cannot be assumed it is because the CMCHA 2007 itself is 
ineffective. Another concern is the restrictiveness of the ‘senior management’ 
test,  however, the test has, in fact, captured a host of individuals who are not 548
senior management.  It could therefore be considered that these concerns do 549
not survive scrutiny.  
 Scottish Parliament (n 10) 12-13543
 E.g. David T Morrison & Co Limited v. ICL Plastics, ICL Tech and Ltd and Stockline Plastics 544
Limited [2012] (n 255); Judiciary of Scotland (n 256)
 Northumbria University (n 257)545
 PS and JE Ward Ltd (n 315); R v. MNS Mining Limited (n 318); Health and Safety Executive v. 546
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust (n 314)
 Cameron (n 254)547
 See e.g. Scottish Parliament (n 10) 9-10548
 Northumbria University (n 257); R v. Sterecycle (Rotherham) Ltd (n 353)549
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The main sanctions under the CMCHA 2007 are fines on the company or a 
publicity order,  however, it has been suggested prison sentences for 550
individual directors may be more suitable.  Senior managers prosecuted for 551
HASWA 1974 offences on corporate manslaughter indictments are typically 
given short sentences.  In terms of the aims of punishment, this would seem 552
to provide retribution but not deterrence. Fines, publicity orders and director 
disqualification may be thought more effective in terms of deterrence and 
rehabilitation as it could be assumed that directors would learn lessons for the 
future. Overall, however, it could be considered that the message of deterrence 
may be clearer if more consistency was applied in decision-making between 
cases. 
As regards how responsibility should be attributed, Weigend centralises the 
actor  whilst Farmer centralises responsibility as an institution.  In both 553 554
theories, it seems that criminal liability should attach where senior managers 
foresaw the risks but continued to act regardless. 
As regards whether civil or criminal liability should attach to corporate 
homicide/manslaughter, it is difficult to say, however, it can be observed that 
Weigend believes severe sanctions should be imposed on intentional rather 
than negligent offending.  This would appear to be more in line with the 555
current 2007 Act than the proposed reform. Having considered what the most 
suitable mens rea for the offence of corporate homicide should be, it could be 
considered that it is negligence as we currently have under the 2007 Act. The 
case law illustrates there is no element of active intention on the part of senior 
managers. Therefore, the current penalty of a fine on their companies rather 
 CMCHA 2007, ss. 1(6) and 10.550
 Scottish Parliament (n 10) 6-7551
 Northumbria University (n 257)552
 Weigend (n 469) 491 553
 Farmer (n 455) 166554
 Weigend (n 469) 494555
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than the proposed reform’s more serious penalty of prison sentences for 
individual senior managers would seem suitable. 
Overall, there is no clear case for reform and the current law as it stands 
appears to be satisfactory. However, it could be recommended that greater use 
of the CMCHA 2007 by the Crown rather than relying on the HASWA 1974 
would be of benefit in addressing any doubts as regards the Act’s efficacy. In 
terms of providing the victims’ families with catharsis, retributive justice may 
be of value.      
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